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Making the Case for Megan's Law: A
Study in Legislative Rhetoric
DANIEL M. FILLER!
INTRODUCTION -
On July 29, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas raped and murdered his neighbor, seven-
year-old MeganKanka.' Timmendequas hadtwo prior convictions for sexual offenses
against children.' The story of this crime, which occurred in a small central New
Jersey community, received national attention.' Within days of Megan's death,
Megan's parents, Richard and Maureen Kanka, began a campaign to pressure the
New Jersey legislature to adopt a sex-offender community-notification law in her
memory.4 Their plea was personal and explicitly tied to the death of their daughter.
"This was God's way of using Megan as a tool to make sure this never happens
again," Maureen Kanka proclaimed.' The state legislature responded quickly and on
October 31, 1994, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman signed Megan's
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University ofAlabama. A.B., Brown University; J.D.,
New York University. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Southeastern
Association of American Law Schools Young Scholars Workshop in 1999. 1 am deeply
appreciative of Wythe Holt and David Hoffman who offered me critical commentary on this
work. I also want to thank Amy Adler, Deborah Epstein, Abbe Smith, Norman Stein, and Kent
Syverud for their valuable comments and insights. Finally, I want to acknowledge Emily
Lassiter's excellent research assistance and the support of Dean Kenneth Randall and the
University of Alabama Law School Foundation.
I. John J. Goldman, Sex Offender Guilty ofKilling Megan Kanka, L.A. TIMES, May 31,
1997, at Al. The best available proof of Timmendequas's actual guilt is that he was convicted
of the crime. The evidence establishing that he committed these crimes was substantial, and it
seems exceedingly likely that he is factually guilty. Nonetheless, a criminal conviction is not
irrefutable proof of guilt and must be viewed with at least some skepticism. We learn again and
again that innocent people are convicted of crimes. See generally JIM DWYERPETERNEUFELD,
& BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
Indeed, the issue of erroneous conviction surfaced in one of the cases discussed in this
Article. Michael Blair was convicted ofkilling Ashley Estell in Piano, Texas. He was sentenced
to death. Recent DNA tests suggest, however, that a hair sample used to tie him to the murder
did not come from Blair. Jim Henderson, DNA Tests Raise Questions About Murder Case,
Hous. CHRON., July 3, 2000, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, HCHRN File. His attorneys are
currently seeking to have his conviction, and death sentence, overturned. Id.
2. Thomas Zambito, New Hearings Will Determine if Wyckoff Rapist Can Be Freed,
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug. 4, 1994, at A3, LEXIS, News Library, NJREC File.
3. A search of the LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (Megan w/sent Kanka) between
August 1, 1994 (the day after Timmendequas's arrest) and August 10, 1994 produced sixty-
four hits, reflecting articles in twenty-one different newspapers, representing eighteen cities and
one national publication. Given the limited scope of the LEXIS database, as well as both the
textual and date limits of the search, this number grossly underestimates the total extent of the
incident's coverage.
4. Steven W. Dill, Pink Ribbons Symbolize Drive for Megan 's Law, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), Aug. 3, 1994, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NJREC File.
5. Id.
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Law.' The call for new sex-offender registration and community-notification laws
spread across the nation,7 motivated by the constant recitation of Megan's tragic
demise. Although many states adopted these provisions of their own accord, in 1994
the U.S. Congress passed legislation effectively requiring every state to establish a
system for registering certain offenders." In 1996 Congress raised its demands,
requiring every state to provide for community notification as well.'" Under pressure
from both Congress and public opinion, every state has now adopted some version
of Megan's Law."'
Support for Megan's Law within both Congress and state legislatures was
overwhelming. When community notification came up for discussion in the U.S.
House of Representatives, for instance, only one representative voiced opposition.'
The provision initially passed the House 415 to 3, but the three opponents of the
law-in an apparent search for political cover-changed their vote, resulting in a
final tally of 418 to 0.3 In Florida, legislators did not bother to debate the merits of
community notification, adopting the provision unanimously.14 Megan's Law passed
6. Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at B1.
7. Registration laws require certain convicted offenders to register with state authorities,
providing them with a current address. Notification laws allow, or require, dissemination of the
registration information to the public at large. In some notification systems, only citizens with
an interest in a particular person will be notified; typically, notification is provided within
certain geographic areas. In more aggressive jurisdictions, the identity of offenders is widely
publicized, frequently via the Internet.
8. The first sex-offender community-notification law actually predated the Megan Kanka
incident. As a result of its own high-profile case of child sexual assault and murder, the state
of Washington adopted the Community Protection Act in 1990. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.24.550, 9A.44.130-.140 (West 2000). State adoption of these laws greatly accelerated after
Kanka's murder. Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community
Notification: Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol's Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333,
334-35 (1998).
9. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders
Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994)
(codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), did not actually require
states to adopt registration provisions. States that did not comply with this federal mandate
were to lose ten percent of their"Byrne Program" criminaIjustice grants. Id. § 170101 (f)(2)(a),
108 Stat. at 2042.
10. See Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(d) (1994)). This provision stated that state law enforcement agencies "shall release
relevant information that is necessary to protect the public." Id.
11. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Consider Remedyfor Government Grudges, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2000, at Al6. For a comprehensive list of state registration and notification laws, see
Kabat, supra note 8, at 365-70. Several states have adopted their own local "brand name" sex-
offender laws. These include Indiana's Zachary's Law, IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (West
2000); North Carolina's Amy Jackson Law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (2000); and Texas's
Ashley's Law, TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 62.01-.12 (Vernon 2001).
12. See infra text accompanying note 177.
13. See 142 CONG. REC. 10,354 (1996).
14. Audio tape: Debate and Vote on H.R. 1665, held by the Florida House of
Representatives (April 2, 1993) (on file with author); Audio tape: Debate and Vote on S. 56,
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with similar ease across the country; in Virginia,"5 Illinois, 6 and Washington,17 for
example, it was approved without a single "no" vote.
While Congress and state legislatures were unanimous in their support for sex-
offender registration and community-notification laws, others who analyzed the
provisions were more critical. Courts struck down portions of these provisions on a
variety of grounds.' 8 Commentators in the media expressed serious doubts about the
bills. 9 And, perhaps not surprisingly, legal scholars offered a varied bundle of
criticisms of the laws.2" Recently, some commentators have suggested that Megan's
held by the Florida Senate (May 1, 1995) (on file with author).
15. The General Assembly 1998 Session, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 4, 1998,
at B4, LEXIS, News Library, VAPILT File.
16. David Heckelman, House OKs Notice Law Covering Sex Offenders, CHI. DAILY LAW
BULL, Nov. 3, 1995, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, CHIDLB File; David Heckelman, Senate
OKs Bill Linking Crime Measures, Storage-Tank Repairs, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Nov. 16,
1995, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, CHIDLB File.
17. Debera Carlton Harrell, Sex-Offender Notification Guidelines Set; Police Can Defer
in Some Cases, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 30, 1990, at BI, LEXIS, News Library,
SEAPIN File.
18. See, e.g., E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1107-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (striking down
provision that placed burden on offender to show he was not sexually violent predator); Roe
v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 192 (D. Mass. 1998) (striking down notification as violation of
double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses); Kansas v. Meyers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan.
1996) (striking down notification as ex post facto law); Louisiana v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814,
817 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 607 (Pa. 1999)
(striking down provision that placed burden on offender to show he was not sexually violent
predator).
19. See, e.g., Community Quandary, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL, Apr. 15, 1996, at 4B, LEXIS,
News Library, PRVJNL File (encouraging states to focus on rehabilitation); Suzanne Fields,
Worrying About the Monster in Our Midst, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 3, 1995, at 25A,
LEXIS, News Library, DALNWS File (arguing that only life sentences for sex offenders
provide safety); GoodIntentions Can Lead to Bad Laws, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 20, 1995,
at A12, LEXIS, News Library, HTCOUR File (suggesting such laws are unconstitutional);
John Q. LaFond, BewarelllusoryRemedies, USATODAYAug. 1I, 1994, at 12A (arguing laws
will not make communities safer); Cathy Young, Look Before Leaping on Megan's Law,
DETROIT NEWS, May 21, 1996, at 12, LEXIS, News Library, DTNEWS File (claiming that
rehabilitation and appropriately longer sentences are better solutions to sex crimes).
20. See, e.g., Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to
Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89 (1996); Toni M.
Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 (1991);
Symposium, Critical Perspectives on Megan's Law: Protection vs. Privacy, 13 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Symposium] (including critical comments from Hon. John
J. Gibbons, Ronald K. Chen, Eric Janus, and others); Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining
Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885 (1995); Michelle L. Earl-
Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty,
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990's,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788 (1996); Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight
Against Child SexualAbuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 569 (1995); G. Scott
Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification ofSex Offenders: Issues ofPunshment, Privacy,
2001]
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Law reflects a recurring type of "moral panic," a widespread, if overblown fear that
the nation's children are at extreme risk.21
Megan's Law is controversial legislation because it targets a narrow segment of the
criminal-offender population, sex offenders, subjecting them to public shame and,
potentially, vigilante violence. Offenders' names and faces are distributed throughout
the community. Schools send notices home with the children,' police mail grainy
pictures to anxious neighbors, and an entire nation peruses sex offender photos on
state-operated Web sites.' Legislators openly acknowledged that the provisions'
benefits came at significant cost to offenders' privacy and security.24
This Article does not attempt to judge Megan's Laws on functional, constitutional,
or sociological grounds. Others have taken on these tasks.25 Moreover, it is unlikely
that politicians would revoke these provisions, even in the face of trenchant new
critiques. Instead, it explores the role of legislative debate rhetoric in the adoption of
these seemingly unstoppable bills.
In recent years, legal scholarship has increasingly focused on the rhetoric of law. 6
The central role of rhetoric in law has always been obvious, of course.27 The entire
first year of law school, for instance, is dedicated to refining students' skills in
reading, understanding, and analyzing judicial opinions. Students spend hours
learning how to make, and refute, legal claims based on the slightest linguistic
and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1633 (1995); Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in
Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex OffenderNotification Laws, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451 (1999).
21. See, e.g., PILP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 6-7, 196-206 (1998). The term was coined by British
sociologists during the early 1970s. See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL
PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERs 191-98 (1972).
22. E.g., Maggie Haberman & Susan Edelman, Queens Schools to Post Pix of Sex
Offenders, N.Y. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at 6 (stating that one New York City school district
would send pictures of local sex offenders home with 36,000 students).
23. One Web site, www.sexoffender.com, provides links to a number of different states'
sexual-offender postings. At the time of this writing, a visitor to this site could find links to
over twenty different state registries. See http://www.sexoffender.com (last visited Oct. 16,
2000).
24. See 142 CONG. REC. 10,313 (1996) (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
25. See, e.g., Kabat, supra note 8; Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities:
Megan's Laws and the Purposes ofPunishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039 (1997); Ellen Liberman,
Megan's Law's Unintended Result: Hysteria, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 17, 1999, at IA,
LEXIS, News Library, PRVJNL File; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. The term rhetoric is used here to refer to "the conventions of discourse and argument."
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546
(1990). Plato's'Gorgias argued that rhetoric included "power to persuade by speech jurymen
in the jury-court, council-men in the Council Chamber, assembly-men in the Assembly, and
in every other gathering, whatever political gathering there may be." PLATO, GORGIAS § 452e,
at 19 (Terence Irwin trans., Clarendon Press 1979)). For an extensive discussion of the
rhetorical tradition, see GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND
SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES (2d ed., rev. & enl. 1999).
27. As one commentator noted, "law is the very profession of rhetoric." Wetlaufer, supra
note 26, at 1554.
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nuances of court decisions. Supreme Court opinions begin to take on almost talmudic
importance, as students search within the concurring opinions for a word here, or a
phrase there, that offers a hint to the Court's future leanings. These law school
exercises are only the beginning. Lawyers and legal scholars build entire careers on
the facile use of rhetoric. For years, legal scholarship engaged in rhetorical analysis
unselfconsciously, attempting to square legal precedents and parsing the language of
judicial opinions. Rarely did they acknowledge these opinions were not themselves
truths but, rather, rhetorical claims.2
The tide has turned, however. More and more, commentators explicitly explore the
role of rhetoric in constructing law, legal power relationships, and even public
perceptions of social crises that lead to new legislation.29 Legal scholars study the
nature and power of judicial rhetoric.30 Some write about the importance of
courtroom rhetoric." Law and economics scholars have begun to acknowledge the
important role of rhetoric in shaping the behavior of "rational actors. 32 Not
surprisingly, legal scholars have even turned a light on their own work. A remarkable
body of literature has developed on the use of storytelling in legal scholarship.3
28. Id. at 1555 ("[If law is, at its core, the practice of rhetoric, the particular rhetoric that
law embraces is the rhetoric of foundations and logical deductions. And that particular rhetoric
is one that relies, above all else, upon the denial that it is rhetoric that is being done.")
(emphasis in original); James Boyd White, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 684, 685 (1985) ("[T]he law is at present
usually spoken of(by academics at least) as if it were a body of more or less determinate rules,
or rules and principles, that are more or less perfectly intelligible to the trained reader.").
This is not to suggest thatwords are inconsequential. Their interpretation can have dramatic
tangible consequences. As Robert Cover explained, "Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion
the imposition of violence upon others: Ajudge articulates her understanding of a text, and as
a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life." Robert M.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Random Violence and the Transformation ofthe Juvenile
Justice Debate, 86 VA. L. REV. 1095, 1109-16 (2000) (discussing the role of activist,
media, and legislative rhetoric in transformingijuvenilejustice debate into a campaign for gun
control).
30. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary
Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477 (1995); David Ray Papke & Kathleen H. McManus,
Narrative and the Appellate Opinion, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 449 (1999); Richard A. Posner,
Judges' Writing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1421 (1995); Frederick
Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1455 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric
of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1371 (1995);
Wetlaufer, supra note 26, at 1560-64; James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CmH.
L. REV. 1363 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity
in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39,45-47 (1994); Wetlaufer, supra note 26, at 1557-60.
32. See, e.g., TimurKuran &Cass R. Sunstein,Availability Cascades andRiskRegulation,
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 703-11 (1999) (arguing that because of human cognitive processes,
rhetoric can have a powerful effect on how individuals perceive and calculate risks).
33. For an important early and legitimizing contribution to this literature, see Symposium,
Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
2001)
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Narrative scholars offer first person stories,34 hypothetical stories," dialogues,36 and
even fictional reworkings of real cases.37 Eventually, even the tax scholars became
storytellers.3' Legal commentators have formed an intellectual scrum, brutally
debating the virtues and vices of narrative scholarship.39
Despite the relentless focus on rhetoric in every nook and cranny of the law,
commentators have forgotten the rhetoric of arguably the most important players in
the legal production process: legislators, the lawmakers themselves. Scholars have
largely ignored the rhetoric of legislative debate.4 It is as if they have failed to notice
34. See, e.g., BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY: COLOR BLINDNESS AND
THE END OFAFFIRMATWE ACTION 1-65 (1997); PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMYOFRACE
AND RIGHTS (1991); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on
"Reproduction "and theLaw, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
1087, 1087-89 (1986).
35. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2418-26 (1989) (offering hypothetical story of an
African-American lawyer denied law teaching job).
36. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO, Tim RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE (1995).
37. See, e.g., David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of
Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 27-
52 (1999) (presenting fictional narration of events leading to important police brutality
prosecution).
38. See Carolyn C. Jones, Mapping Tax Narratives, 73 TLt. L. REV. 653, 659-63 (1998).
39. Among those supporting narrative scholarship, see, for example, Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 279-80 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46
STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); George A. Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use of
Narrative in Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683 (1999). Examples of articles critical of narrative
scholarship include Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of
Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
The debate has continued, and even heated up, over time. In 1997, Farber and Sherry
published a book crystallizing their critiques of narrative scholarship, and what they termed
"radical multiculturalism." DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:
THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997). This book triggered vitriolic
criticism from a variety of commentators. Indeed, the Minnesota Law Review dedicated an
entire (angry) volume to criticism of this single book. See generally, Symposium, Essays in
Response to Beyond All Reason, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1589 (1999).
40. Although there are no comprehensive studies of the rhetoric of a bill's legislative
debate, a few scholars have discussed legislative rhetoric. E.g., Chai R. Feldblum, The Moral
Rhetoric ofLegislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992 (1997) (recounting subcommittee conversation
about morality during consideration of Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1997); David
A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797 (1998) (criticizing role of
patient-dumping stories in Congress's adoption of Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act); J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name?: A Rhetorical Reading of
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator's Act, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 781 (1991)
(discussing rhetoric presented to, and used by, Washington Governor's Task Force on
Community Prevention); Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's
[Vol. 76:315
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the central role of statutes in American law.
This gap in the legal literature is quite remarkable. Notwithstanding the importance
ofjudicial and courtroom rhetoric, the rhetoric of legislative debate demands special
scrutiny. Legislative debate is a highly public process, concerning public problems,
with serious and far-reaching consequences. The study of legislative rhetoric is
essential to comprehending what laws we have, why we have them, and how they will
be applied in the future.4! '
Legislative debate is a critical step in the production of new law. On the one hand,
debate offers legislators a chance to show constituents-voters and donors
alike-that they are kindred spirits.42 In that sense, legislative debate is a mirror of
society, a legislator's opportunity to prove she shares prevailing social values. On the
other hand, legislative debate is a chance for representatives to transform opinions of
others. It is a time to pressure opponents, sway the views ofpolitical and media elites,
and reach out to the voters, persuading them of a new perspective or explaining an
unpopular vote. For some legislators, debate can even be an opportunity for personal
testimony.43 Debate forms a body of legislative history when courts later interpret the
law." It can create a precedent establishing the parameters of legitimate public
discourse.45 And it represents a historical text, a form of legislative DNA, a roadmap
Use of Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1998)
(discussing use of narrative at various points in legislative history of Defense of Marriage Act).
Scholars in disciplines outside law have also looked at legislative rhetoric, although to
somewhat different ends. E.g. David Austen-Smith, Information Transmission in Debate, 34
AM.J. POL. ScL 124 (1990) (studying role oflegislative debate on committee decisions); Carrie
Crenshaw, Resisting Whiteness'Rhetorical Silence, 61 W.J. CoMM. 253 (1997) (analyzing role
of whiteness as explicit issue in U.S. Senate debate over reauthorization of United Daughters
of the Confederacy insignia patent); Nancy A. Naples, The "New Consensus" on the
"Gendered Social Contract": The 1987-1988 US. Congressional Hearings on Welfare
Reform, 22 SIGNS 907 (1997) (analyzing "discursive frames" of welfare reform within
Congressional hearings).
41. Indeed, scholars debating the appropriate judicial use of legislative history implicitly
concede the importance of legislative rhetoric. Their workhas typically focused on the singular
problem of divining legislative intent, however, rather than on broader questions about the role
and impact of legislative rhetoric.
42. See, e.g., Richard A. Smith, Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S.
Congress, 78 AM. POL Sci. REv. 44, 46 (1984) (arguing that a legislator's public comments
are designed to show how a legislator's voting choice is consistent with existing preferences
of audiences).
43. Assemblyman Spano in the New York Megan's Law debate, for instance, dedicated
several minutes to a detailed description of his own childhood abduction at the hands of a man
who wanted to make "dirty movies." N.Y. Assembly Minutes ofAl 059C, at 342-46 (June 28,
1995) [hereinafter N.Y. Assembly] (statement of Mr. Spano) (copy on file with the Indiana
Law Journal).
44. For a discussion about the use of legislative debate in judicial interpretation, see infra
note 66-69 and accompanying text.
45. In the Clinton impeachment debate, for instance, legislators looked to the Watergate




explaining how and why new law was created.'
Some legislative debate is more public than others. U.S. congressional debate is
documented in its entirety in the Congressional Record. Once only available to the
persistent scholar, or the wealthy LEXIS subscriber, the Congressional Record can
now be obtained free on the Internet.47 For those with cable television, congressional
debate is captured, gavel to gavel, on C-SPAN.48 State legislative debate is often a
more private affair. For those lacking regular television coverage of legislative
proceedings, the best way to learn the content of state legislative debate is to attend
in person or read media accounts. While a few states maintain written records of
proceedings, in many states debate is preserved only in audio recordings or the
memories of those in attendance. Whether debate is broadcast from the nearest
television, or burrowed quietly in the chambers of the state house, however, these
legislative speeches can tell us a good deal about why we have the laws we have and
what these laws mean.49
By describing and analyzing the rhetoric of Megan's Law, a simultaneously
controversial and unassailable piece of criminal law,"0 this Article presents the first
comprehensive study of the rhetoric of legislative debate. In doing so, it addresses
and begins to fill a troubling hole in the literature of rhetoric and law. At first glance,
the Megan's Law debates might not seem a fertile ground for such research. Given
the overwhelming legislative support for the laws, the debates might have been short
and sterile; after all, few legislators needed convincing. Yet, despite good reasons to
expect vapid debates, these legislative discussions proved engaging and controversial.
While they were one-sided, similar perhaps to certain other bills expanding criminal
law,5 the Megan's Law debates provide an excellent starting point for studying how
46. Although some scholars discount legislative debate, and legislative history generally,
for the purposes ofjudicial interpretation, see infra text accompanying note 66, the rhetorical
choices made by legislators nonetheless show us how they sought to publicly frame the new
law. That information, in turn, tells us something about both the bill and the society into which
the bill was born.
47. The Congressional Record is available from the Library of Congress through
THOMAS: Legislative Information on the Internet, at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb.
9, 2001).
48. STEVEN FRANTZICH & JOHN SULLIVAN, THE C-SPAN REVOLUTION 124 (1996).
49. The meaning of a law is not fixed, ofcourse. A given law may serve different functions
and may represent different things to different people. By studying legislative speeches,
however, we can discover how legislators may have understood these laws, how courts are
likely to apply them, and how society was convinced to accept their adoption.
50. "Criminal law" is used here in its broad sense, including not only criminal offenses and
punishments, but also law collaterally regulating offenders. Other good examples of formally
civil "criminal laws" are qui tam and civil forfeiture actions. Qui tam, or "private attorney
general," provisions were created to allow citizen enforcement of criminal law. Harold J. Krent,
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessonsfrom History, 38 AM. U. L.
REv. 275, 297 (1989). Civil forfeiture provisions allow government seizure "of a man's
property by reason of offences committed by him." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634
(1886).
51. Some criminal laws, such as those that regulate guns, pollution, and other well-funded
interests, are the subject of significant dispute. Debate about criminal laws dealing with "blue-
collar crime"--violence, theft, sex offenses, for example-might be expected to be more one-
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legislators talk about new law. One can assume that if these debates provide a rich
trove of rhetorical material, other scholars will be spurred to study the debates of
more partisan legislation.
This Article chooses two paradigmatic debates for comparison: legislative disputes
in the U.S. Congress and the New York state legislature.52 Part I offers a framework
for this study. It begins by suggesting several practical purposes served by legislative
debate. It then explains the decision to study Congress and the New York debates,
setting out the particular laws under consideration. It also describes the structure of
debate in these two jurisdictions. Part II then gives the results of the study, providing
an extensive description of the Megan's Law legislative debates in both the U.S.
Congress and the New York state legislature. It segments the debates into three
thematic areas: arguments justifying the need for new sex offender legislation, claims
regarding the benefits of Megan's Law, and discussions about problems with the law.
Part III analyzes and critiques the debates. It explores the pros and cons of legislators'
heavy use of victim narratives. It critiques legislators' use of statistics and suggests
that, despite the actual scope of Megan's Law, legislators framed the bill exclusively
in terms of child protection. Finally, it discusses legislators' explicit and implicit
claims about the bills' demographic impact. Part IV considers whether the rhetoric
of Megan's Law served the practical purposes of legislative debate. It suggests that
rhetoric may have influenced voting decisions, educated the public both in good and
problematic ways, and provided courts useful material for judicial review. Finally,
this part offers limited suggestions for improving legislative rhetoric.
I. FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY
A. The Practical Purposes of Legislative Debate
Before beginning the study of legislative rhetoric, it is worth first considering the
practical purposes of debate. Although a worthwhile project, this Article does not
make claims about the proper role of legislative debate in a democratic representative
government. It therefore does not attempt to evaluate whether the rhetoric of Megan's
Law contributed in a normatively "good" way to the goals of democratic government.
Instead, this Article simply posits that, as a practical matter, legislative debate serves
at least three purposes.
First, debate can influence legislative voting decisions. Rhetoric influences these
decisions directly when it persuades representatives to change their opinion on an
issue. Although some scholars have assumed that legislators make up their minds
before debate,53 others argue that debate can affect these decisions.54 Debate can also
sided.
52. The legislative debate in the Congress was an example of virtually one-sided dialogue;
only one person spoke against any portion of Megan's Law, and even he ultimately voted for
it. The debate in New York, while reflecting strong support for the bill, also included
substantial and sharp criticism from a small cadre of opponents. For a further discussion of the
reasons for studying these two debates, see infra text accompanying note 70.
53. See, e.g., Ronald D. Elving, Brighter Lights, Wider Windows: Presenting Congress in
the 1990s, in CONGRESS, THE PRESS, AND THE PuBLIc 171, 171-74 (Thomas E. Mann &
Norman L Ornstein eds., 1994) (discussing Congress's history of private deal making and
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influence votes less directly, even when they do not alter legislators' core beliefs
about a bill. Legislators frequently vote based on their self-interested concern for
reelection." When advocates for a popular bill use rhetoric that alerts otherwise
inattentive citizens about the proposal, opponents may recalculate the risks of
opposing a bill and thus change their vote.' In Congress particularly, where
legislative debates are nationally televised, legislative rhetoric is particularly capable
of capturing public attention and captivating voter interest.5 '
Because it is a public process, legislative debate also functions as an educational
tool. Both the media and individual citizens look to legislators as a source of
information;58 legislators are, after all, elected to do the grunt work of policy
analysis.59 Reporters, for instance, frequently cite legislators' comments uncritically.
The advent of C-SPAN has radically expanded the educative function of
congressional debate. C-SPAN promotes public education three ways. First, political
and media elite rely on C-SPAN as an informational source.' Second, the media uses
C-SPAN as a provider of news content.6' Third, a surprising number of politically
anonymity).
54. See, e.g., JoSEPHM.BESsETTE, THEMILD VOICEOFREASON:DELIBERATEDEMOCRACY
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 166 (1997).
55. Many commentators argue that the goal of reelection is the leading force in legislative
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice,
57 U. CHi. L. REV. 63, 88 (1990). Others, however, argue that ideology may trump the desire
for reelection, or may shape legislators' understandings of the best way to be reelected. See,
e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57 (199 1).
56. Political scientist R. Douglas Arnold argues that voters can be divided into "attentive
publics" and "inattentive publics." R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION 64-71 (1990). Arnold argues that legislators "feel electorally pressured to serve
inattentive citizens only if an issue is salient or potentially salient to substantial numbers of
those citizens." Id. at 128. Legislators must therefore watch debate carefullyto see if it is likely
to activate these otherwise inattentive citizens. Arnold contends that congressional leaders can
use public procedures, like legislative debate, to force legislators to "stand up and be counted."
Id. at 130.
57. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Arguably, C-SPAN viewers are the public
segment least likely to have been inattentive in the first place. Studies show they are a
particularly politically engaged group. See infra note 62.
58. See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1997) (indicating that crime news stories rely heavily on "official
sources"); JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT CHILD
VICTIMS 89, 95 (1990) (noting that the press relies on comments of political leaders and
showing example of legislative floor speech used as a news peg).
59. See N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 312-13 (statement of Ms. John).
60. C-SPAN is watched by disproportionate numbers of state-level politicians and
government officials, CEO's, and newspaper editors. Not only do these influential individuals
watch C-SPAN, providing a particularly influential target population for legislative floor
speeches, a remarkable thirty-three percent of this group "credit C-SPAN with causing them
to change their minds on a public issue." FRANTZICH & SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 243-44.
Frantzich and Sullivan also found that "journalists report an increasing use of C-SPAN for
monitoring the political process." Id. at 243.
61. C-SPAN permits the media to use up to three minutes of television coverage for free.
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engaged voters watch C-SPAN directly. 2 Legislative debate is an opportunity for
representatives to both inform the media and the public, and to shape public
opinion. 3 Legislators in both Congress" and New York 5 made statements expressly
reflecting this objective.
Finally, legislative debate helps courts interpret new law. When the meaning of a
law is not apparent, and sometimes even when it is, courts look to legislative history
as an interpretive tool. Although some commentators, and two Supreme Court
justices, rail against the widespread use of legislative history, courts routinely rely
on these materials in their analyses.67 At times, courts use this rhetoric as legislators
Hoping to take advantage of free press during the evening news, legislators will contact local
media to let them know when they are scheduled to make floor speeches. Id. at 46. Not
surprisingly, local stations take advantage of the free material, and show C-SPAN clips on their
news programs. Forrest Maltzman & Lee Sigelman, The Politics of Talk: Unconstrained Floor
Time in the U.S. House of Representatives, 58 J. PoL 819, 820 (1996).
62. Brian Lamb, the creator of C-SPAN and current Chairman and CEO, estimated that the
viewership of the network is typically between 50,000 and 100,000; however, at peak times,
it can reach about three million. FRANTZCH& SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 226-28. Viewership
is relatively broad. A 1994 survey showed that "8.6% of the U.S. population had watched C-
SPAN 'during the last week,' and a 1992 study indicated that the average viewer who watched
C-SPAN watched it for twenty-one hours per month. Id.
The most remarkable aspect of the C-SPAN viewership is its level of political engagement.
In The C-SPANRevolution, Frantzich and Sullivan suggest that C-SPAN viewers vote much
more frequently than the rest of America; they indicate that these viewers vote "at rates 25-35
percentage points above the national averages in both presidential and off year elections." Id.
at 236. In fact, even this estimate may be conservative; a 1988 University of Maryland survey
showed that "84% of C-SPAN viewers were registered to vote" and, of these, 92% actually
voted. Id. at 234, 236.
63. See 142 CONG. REC. 17,114 (1996) (statement of Rep. Doman) (recommending that
viewers obtain an informative magazine article).
64. Cf. BECKETT, supra note 58, at 24-25 (concluding that public fears about crime are
shaped more by conments of political leaders than actual crime rates).
65. See, e.g., N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 395 (statement of Ms. Katz) (warning
listeners that bill will not be panacea).
66. Justice Scalia, for instance, argues that reliance on legislative history is almost always
improper. E.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,279-83 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (making the case against interpretation with legislative history).
For a more thorough discussion of what he terms this "new textualism," see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., TheNew Textualism, 37 UCLAL. REV. 621 (1990). Others argue that use of such
legislative materials is wholly appropriate. E.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative
History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
67. Indeed, a trial court-though later reversed-relied on New York's legislative debates
to strike down New York's Megan's Law. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603,621-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), rev'd in relevant part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
A majority of the Supreme Court relies upon legislative materials to interpret statutes. See,
e.g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) (using congressional floor speeches to
interpret meaning of federal caracking statute). Some commentators criticize legislative debate
as a less reliable form of legislative history. See WIuIAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR. ETAL, LEGISLATION
AND STATuTORY INTERPRETATION304 (2000) (arguing that courts are more likely to rely only
on committee reports and statements of supporters because "[t]here is less reason to think that
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intend, adopting the meaning articulated by bills' supporters." Other times, though,
courts may use supporters' rhetoric to invalidate a law establishing, for instance, that
legislators' intentions were impermissible.69 However it is ultimately used by courts,
legislative rhetoric influences the subsequent application and interpretation of new
law.
B. The Laws Under Study
This Article presents a study of both federal and state debate.70 Federal debate was
chosen because it may reflect broad, national themes. Also, members of Congress
maintain a national profile and are more likely to provide both policy and rhetorical
cues to state legislators. Because most criminal law is created and enforced by states,
however, and because the federal Megan's Law was principally a mandate for state
action, it seemed essential to study some state level debate. The New York debate
... [other legislative] material reflects the views of the enacting coalition and more reason to
worry that it might have been strategically planted in the record"). Nonetheless, many courts
rely on these sorts of floor remarks when interpreting statutes. E.g., Holloway, 526 U.S. at 9
n.7 (relying on remarks of two supporters of carjacking bill to prove law's "broad deterrent
purpose'); In re G.O., 710 N.E.2d 140, 144, 146 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999) (interpreting intent of
juvenilejustice statute through extensive citation to state legislative debate); Dilleheyv. Texas,
815 S.W.2d 623, 624-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing text of the legislative debate and
claiming that the court has long honored "as binding evidence of legislative intent, bill analyses
and study group reports and legislative council reports and floor debate"); see also United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (citing, in both majority and dissent, comments
from a variety of different legislators).
68. See, e.g., Holloway, 526 U.S. at 9.
69. The Supreme Court has held that statements by legislators are particularly valuable for
establishing a legislature's discriminatory intent. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252,268 (1977); cf. Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (relying in part on city council speeches to strike down regulation on
Santeria practice); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985) (citing statements at
Alabama constitutional convention to establish racially neutral law was motivated by racial
animus).
70. This study relied entirely on written transcripts of both the federal and New York
debates. Compared to the New York debates, congressional debate, documented in the
Congressional Record, was easy to secure. State legislative debate is often more difficult to
exhume, but transcripts of the New York debate were obtained upon written request. The
decision to make use of written transcripts is not necessarily without consequence. First, there
is a risk of inaccurate documentation. Studies have shown that the Congressional Record is,
in the main, accurate. See J.A. Hendrix, A New Look at the Textual Authenticity of Speeches
in the Congressional Record, 31 S. SPEECH . 153, 159 (1965). The accuracy of New York's
transcription, on the other hand, is not known. Nonetheless, because this study does not focus
on microscopic aspects of rhetoric-verb choice, for instance, or the use of alliteration-it is
unlikely that transcription errors would alter this Article's conclusions. A second drawback to
reliance on a written record is that important aspects of oratory, such as tone and cadence, are
lost. Although this infirmity limits, to some extent, the scope of this Article, it again seems
unlikely that the absence of this detail would alter any of the broader conclusions here. In the
next section, then, this Article sets out the results of the study, it provides an account of the
Megan's Law debate as it unfolded in each of these two jurisdictions.
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served as a good counterpoint to the federal dialogue. First, unlike some state
legislatures, New York representatives bothered to debate the merits of the bill, In
addition, because of New York's political diversity, a small cadre of vocal opponents
staked out rhetoricalpositions against the bill." Finally, the twojurisdictions featured
structurally dissimilar debates.'
For ease of explanation, this Article frequently refers to the "federal Megan's Law"
and "New York's Megan's Law." In fact, the federal Megan's Law is really a set of
three laws passed at different times.73 In 1994, Congress considered and passed the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders
Registration Act ("Wetterling Act").74 This provision compelled states75 to register
offenders convicted of a wide range of sexual offenses, regardless of the age of the
victims, as well as those convicted of certain nonsexual offenses against children,
including nonparental kidnapping and false imprisonment.76 Two years later,
Congress adopted two additional laws involving these offenders. The first actually
entitled Megan's Law," required states to adopt some formofcommunitynotification
for those offenders already covered by the Wetterling Act.7" The second, called the
Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996,"9 created a
federal database containing this registration data."
The New York law, officially titled the Sex Offender Registration Act.s ' was a
single comprehensive bill requiring certain individuals to register, mandating that the
state categorize these individuals into groups based on their danger to the community
and authorizing varying types of community notification based on their risk group.'
The law applied to offenders convicted of a host of sexual offenses committed against
children, ranging from forcible rape to consensual sex with a minor to possession of
71. See infra text accompanying notes 190-206.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 190-206.
73. The decision to refer to these laws as "Megan's Laws" within the text of this Article
reflects a decision to allow the powerful story of Megan Kanka to inform every reference to
these provisions. It was a practical decision, one designed to aid a reader's understanding of
this piece. This footnote is designed, however, to alertreaders to the potential emotional impact
of this editorial choice.
74. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 14071
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
75. Failure to comply with this regulation would have subjected a state to criminal-justice-
funding cuts. Id.
76. The exclusion of parental kidnapping and false imprisonment probably was an
acknowledgment of the complicated motivations that might cause anoncustodial parent to take
physical custody of her child.
77. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
14071(d) (1994)).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994).
79. Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (Supp. IV 1998)).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (Supp. IV 1998).
81. N.Y. CoRRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
82. Id.
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child pornography.8 3 Like the federal law, it also covered individuals convicted of
kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment of child victims, so long as the offender was
not a parent,' and offenders convicted of forcible sexual offenses against people of
any age.
85
C. The Structure of the Debates
The structures of the federal and New York debates differed. Congressional debate
can be an extended and diffuse process. In some ways, the term "debate" is a
misnomer, because the discussion of new law can occur during designated debates
as well as in supplemental periods set aside for speeches on any topic.86 Debate about
the Wetterling Act was further complicated by the fact that discussion of the
provision was intermingled with conversation about other portions of the overarching
crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.7 Floor
debate over registration began in early 1993, and ended upon the bill's passage in
August 1994.8" Discussion about extending the Wetterling Act to include community
notification began in mid-1994 and continued until passage of Megan's Law in
1996.89 As is common in congressional debate, where representatives often prepare
their statements in advance, speeches did not typically address each other in a back
and forth fashion. In any case, there was minimal disagreement. Only one legislator,
Representative Watt of North Carolina, spoke out against any of the bills, openly
83. Id. §§ 168-192
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The House, for instance, provides for one- and five-minute speeches and "extended
remarks," allowing opportunities for legislators to speak out publicly on any topic they choose.
Forrest Maltzman& Lee Sigelman, The Politics of Talk: Unconstrained Floor Time in the U.S.
House of Representatives, 58 J. POL. 819, 819 (1996); see also Committee on Rules, U.S.
House of Representatives, Floor Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, at
http://www.house.gov/ruleslfloor_man.htm(lastvisitedJan. 9,2001). These types ofspeeches
were included within the debate studied here.
87. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994)).
88. The first floor discussion of registration came in the context of the freestanding Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act, H.R. REP. No. 103-324 (1993), reprinted in 1994
U.SC.C.A.N. 1801. E.g., 139 CoNG. REc. 10,998 (1993) (statement of Rep. Ramstad). The
Wetterling Act was ultimately incorporated into the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, and debate continued until August 25, 1994, the date that the Senate agreed
to the conference report of the bill. E.g., 140 CONG. REC. 24,005-06 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
89. Initial discussion about community notification occurred during consideration of the
more limited Wetterling Act. E.g., 140 CONG. REC. 10,638 (1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton)
(arguing in favor of S.2363, a bill that would have required states to create both registration
and notification procedures). Debate continued until May 7, 1996, two days before the bill
passed. E.g., 142 CONG. REc. 10,313 (1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). Indeed,
discussion of these sex-offense issues continued until adoption of the Lyncher Act on
September 26, 1996. E.g., 142 CONG. REC. H11,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Zimmer).
[Vol. 76:315
MAKING A CASE FOR MEGANS LAW
opposing both 1996 provisions.' The lack of conflict did not silence supporters of
these laws, however. Quite the contrary, many congressmen and senators spoke out
on the bills, often with passion and even vitriol.
In New York, on the other hand, the debate was more focused. In both the
Assembly and the Senate, legislators homed in on this single piece of legislation
during a single day. The New York debate featured far more conflict than in
Congress. Although the bill passed overwhelmingly,9 several assemblymen and
senators voiced disapproval of the legislation and supporters responded with their
own impassioned appeals. Unlike the congressional debate, legislators' comments
appeared to be improvised and legislators actually addressed one another.
Despite differences between the bills, and the structure of debate, the substantive
discussions about Megan's Law were comparable. Both included extended debate
about the need for new law and both focused on the registration and notification
provisions themselves, rather than upon concerns about the appropriate role of state
versus federal intervention.' A comparison of the two debates proved workable
because they did in fact cover much common ground, and because New York's law
was very similar to the minimum law mandated by the federal Megan's Law.
11. A DESCRIPTIVE AccouNT OF THE MEGAN'S LAW
LEGISLATIVE DEBATES
Legislative debates do not flow like well crafted narrative. Instead, they are a
sprawling series of individual speeches which are best studied as an organic whole.
Short of replicating the complete debates, any description of them necessarily will be
reductive. This Part divides the debates into three thematic groups: arguments
justifying the need for new sex-offender laws, claims about the anticipated benefits
of Megan's Law, and discussions about possible drawbacks to the proposal. Federal
and New York legislative rhetoric is presented side by side within each thematic
group to allow for easy comparison.
A. Justification for New Legislation
This section outlines legislators' claims about the need for new sex-offender
regulations.93 Legislators offered three types of arguments to explain their support for
Megan's Law. First, they told anecdotal stories of child victimization. Second, they
provided a variety of statistics designed to show the extent and intractability of the
90. See infra text accompanying note 177. Ironically, Representative Watt must have been
sufficiently concerned about the political consequences of opposing this legislation that,
despite his public complaints on the House floor, including a claim that the bill was "un-
American," Watt ultimately voted in favor of the legislation. See infra text accompanying note
181.
91. The final NewYork Senatetallywas 54to 1; in theAssembly, supportersprevailed 140
to 9.
92. Both debates featured some discussion of federalism-related issues. See infra text
accompanying notes 186, 197.
93. While the provisions of Megan's Law were not limited to sex offenders, see supra text
accompanying note 76, arguments about the law focused almost exclusively on this population.
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sex-offender problem. Third, they used dehumanizing language to describe these
offenders, presumably showing this population's suitability for additional social
sanctions.
1. Anecdotal Narratives
The single most common rhetorical trope employed in both the federal and New
York debates was the citation and description of individual cases of child abduction,
sexual abuse, and murder. Again and again, legislators argued the need for new sex-
offender legislation by referring, in varying levels of detail, to particularly well-
known incidents. Most of these cases had already received substantial national media
coverage.94
Although both debates relied upon these narratives, U.S. representatives and
senators used high-profile stories more consistently than did their New York
counterparts. This reliance on stories began at the bills' inceptions; both Jacob
Wetterling and Megan Kanka were famous crime victims." Thus, even the slightest
94. Articles discussing Megan Kanka included Girl's Killing Sparks Call for New Laws,
S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 3, 1994, at A10, LEXIS, News Library, SFEXAM File; Man Charged
in 7-Year-OldNeighbor's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at B5; Anna Quindlen, So What
if Law Isn't Fair to Sex Offenders? Children Come First, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8, 1994, at 13.
Coverage of the Polly Klaas incident included Michelle Locke, Paroled Kidnapper Held in
California Girl's Abduction, CER. SUN-TImES, Dec. 2, 1993, at 56, LEXIS, News Library,
CHISUN File; Richard C. Paddock, All-Out SearchforMissing Girl, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993,
at A3; Witnesses Identify Suspect in California Girl'sAbduction, Am. J.-CONST., Dec. 3, 1993,
at A4, LEXIS, News Library, ATLJNL File. Stories about Amber Hagerman included Search
for Girl Ends, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1996 (Evening Update ed.), at 2, LEXIS, News Library,
CHTRIB File; Shannon Tangonan, "Brutal"End to Kidnapping, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 1996,
at 3A, LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File. Articles about Ashley Estell included Kevin
Caston, Searchers Find Body of Child, DAUAS MORNMNGNEWS, Sept. 6, 1993, at 1A, LEXIS,
News Library, DALNWS File; Child Molester Is Charged in Killing, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16,
1993, at A6, LEXIS, News Library, SFEXAM File.
95. According to news accounts, Jacob Wetterling, ten, was abducted at gunpoint by a
masked man on October 22, 1989. After One Week, No Kidnap Clues, CIE. TRM., Oct. 29,
1989, at 16. He had been walking with his brother and another friend in their small town, St.
Josephs, Minnesota. Id. The perpetrator allegedly fled with Wetterling on foot. He has never
been found. Id.
Megan Kanka, a seven year old, was invited to the home of her neighbor, Jesse
Timmendequas, to look at his puppy. Dale Russakoff, Case Driving 'Megan's Law'Results in
Murder Conviction: Jury to Decide Whether to Seek Execution, WASH. POST, May 31, 1997,
at Al. There, according to the evidence at trial, he raped and murdered her. Id. According to
initial press accounts, neither Richard and Maureen Kanka-Megan's parents-nor the rest of
the neighborhood was aware that Timmendequas, and his housemates, had previously been
convicted of sexual offenses. Anna Quindlen, Editorial, The Passion to Keep Them Safe, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at 19. Later accounts cast doubt on the veracity of this claim. See infra
text accompanying notes 246-49. The third federal law was named after Pam Lyncher, a Texas
anticrime activist killed in a plane crash. Prison May Be Named After Lyncher, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 27, 1996, at 22A (describing Lyncher as a victims'-rights leader),
LEXIS, News Library, DALNWS File.
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reference to these bills immediately invoked memories of their victimization.
Legislators discussed these brutal stories again and again, sometimes in graphic
detail. Representative Zimmer, for instance, provided a heart rending description of
the Megan Kanka case:
jOin July 29, 1994, a beautiful little girl named Megan Kanka was lured into the
home of a man who literally lived across the street from her. He said that he had
a puppy he wanted to show her. He then proceeded to brutally rape and murder
this little girl. 6
A few minutes later, Representative Jackson-Lee reminded listeners that the bill was
named after "Megan Kanka, who was raped and strangled and murdered by a twice-
convicted pedophile who lived across the street from her."'97 These instances reflect
only a small number of the references to Megan Kanka. The story of Megan Kanka
was mentioned repeatedly. 8
Legislators told stories of other children as well. Representative Upton offered an
account of an interstate kidnapping:
Mr. Speaker, last year I had two little boys, sons of migrant workers from Texas,
in my district who were stolen allegedly by a sexual molester... out from Iowa,
picked them up in the twin cities in Michigan; and thank goodness, because it
was a nationwide case and CNN and ABC News and "Good Morning America"
had his picture, they found him in New Orleans."
Other cases were described in far greater detail. There was the matter of Polly
Klaas, for instance, from California. SenatorFeinstein explained that "[m]anypeople
throughout our Nation have come to know about this 12-year-old girl from Petaluma,
CA, a small, close-knit communitynorth ofSan Francisco" who had been "kidnapped
fromherbedroom on October 1, 1993, by a bearded, knife-wielding man who tied her
up and threatened to slit her friends' throats as her mother slept in a nearby room..
.. [The assailant] fled with Polly," who was later found dead."°° She added additional
evocative detail. Klaas's body was: "dumped beside a highway. Next to Polly's body
police found a specialty condom identical to one [the assailant] had bought at the
adult novelty store Seductions a day or two before the kidnapping, according to the
store's former owner. Polly's clothes were pushed up to her waist."'' Feinstein
immediately followed Polly's story with the tale of another child victim:
The secondlittle girl I want to tell you about, Amber Hagerman, was visiting her
grandparents on January 13 of this year, the day she was kidnapped. An
eyewitness later told police that he saw a white or Hispanic man pull the child
from her pink tricycle and drag her into a black pickup truck. She was found dead
4 days later-her clothes stolen from her lifeless little body-in a creek behind
96. 142 CONG. REc. 10,311 (1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
97. Id. at 10,313 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
98. E.g., id. at 10,664-65 (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. at 10,312 (statement of Rep.
Smith); id. at 10,361 (statement of Rep. Fox).
99. Id. at 10,315 (statement of Rep. Upton).






Even more than Representatives Zimmer and Upton, Feinstein told stories that were
palpable, easy to visualize, and difficult to forget.0 3
One of the more interesting and elaborate narratives was presented by Senator
Gramm of Texas, describing an incident from his home state:
Three years ago, a 7-year-old girl named Ashley Estell went to 4 park in Piano,
TX, which is an upscale suburb of Dallas, one of the finest communities in
America, and certainly we would assume one of the safest. She went to the park
that day to watch her brother play soccer. Ashley's brother played in the second
of three games to be played that day and while her parents stayed to watch the
final game, Ashley went to play on a swing set. Although there were 2,000 people
in the park that day, this little girl was, nevertheless, abducted, raped and brutally
murdered.
... The FBI, using the 14 tapes that were turned in [by people who had been
videotaping games on the playground], was able to go back and identify a known
sexual predator who had been there the day Ashley was abducted ....
What shocked Plano, the whole metroplex and, to some degree, the entire
country, was not just this tragic crime, but the fact that the FBI ... identified not
one but two sexual predators who were in the park on that day. It turned out that
the referee of all three soccer games played that day was a convicted sexual
predator, who had fled fromNorth Carolina to Texas to avoid being sent to prison
for 10 years.'04
Every congressional story told in support of Megan's Law featured a child victim
who suffered serious abuse. Legislators did not tell any stories involving arguably
less disturbing offenses like consensual sex with minors or possession of child
pornography, both of which fell within the ambit of Megan's Law. More importantly,
legislators eschewed accounts featuring adult victims. They focused only on vivid,
dramatic, and undeniable cases of child victimization.
Stories of child victimization were somewhat less common in the New York
debates. Unlike the federal discussions, where legislators dedicated much, if not all,
of their commentary to the mention, or graphic description, of individual victim
stories, state legislators used storytelling more sparingly. 5
Interestingly, the story of Megan Kanka's abduction itself was not featured
prominently within the New York debate. The Kanka case was mentioned, to be sure.
Maureen Kanka was present during the Senate debate,0 6 placing Megan's murder
silently, but powerfully, at the center of discussion. The New York bill was explicitly
tied to the Kanka murder. Senator Skelos explained, for instance, that "[tihe purpose
102. Id.
103. Moments later, Senator Hutchison also mentioned the Hagerman story, saying that
"[s]he was kept alive for at least 48 hours before being murdered. Her nude, slashed body was
found in a creek bed ... ." Id. at 18,765 (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
104. Id. at 7747 (statement of Sen. Granun).
105. Indeed one legislator, Senator Leichter, expressly cautioned about excessive reliance
on the emotionally powerful Megan Kanka storyto the exclusion of logic and reason. See N.Y.
Senate Minutes of S- 1 I-B, at 6624 (May 24, 1995) [hereinafter N.Y. Senate] (statement of Sen.
Leichter) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
106. See id. at 6583 (statement of Sen. Rath).
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for this [bill] is to avoid the Megan Kanka tragedy that we saw in New Jersey.""7
Legislators also linked the New York law to other registration and notification laws
bearing Megan's name."0 8 In the main, however, legislators relied upon New York
stories, tales of local child victims, and abusers.
One narrative New York legislators mentioned on several occasions involved a girl
from Binghamton, New York. "Sherry Lindsay, who was the daughter of ... a retired
Binghamton police officer... was lured into the house of a convicted sex offender
while... trying to make a little extra money. She was held in the basement for three
days before he finally killed her."'" Another legislator noted the case of"a little four-
year-old girl that was abducted, raped and murdered. Had this bill been in place
before this, maybe her parents wouldn't have let her go to this man's house, to his
apartment and see this man."1"' Perhaps the most detailed child-victim narrative
involved a boy named Steven Stayner
A man walked up to him in a mall with a whole set of papers and said, "Steven,
your parents don't love you anymore, they really don't want you to be with them
anymore. They are out in the car and they asked me to take you." And he
convinced, this pedophile, Steven Stayner to get in the car.
You know what he did ... ? Every 15 minutes he stopped at a pay telephone.
Now, Steven Stayner was an intelligent boy. He said, "Steven, can you tell me
your telephone number? I want to call your mom and dad and tell them you love
them very much and want to be with them."
He stopped at a pay phone for 24 hours every 15 minutes, made believe he
was dialing Steven Stayner's telephone number-really didn't-he hung up, "Mr.
and Mrs. Stayner, he loves you very much, he doesn't know why you filed those
papers in court. Would you please take--" "Steven, your parents hung up. They
really don't want you back. They want you to stay with me. They don't want you
to be back with them, they want you to stay with me."
He did that for 24 hours to a five-year-old boy every 15 minutes, and you
know what? Steven Stayner stayed with that man for seven years.
They moved to a school district an hour and a half from his original school
district. Steven made excuses why his mother wasn't there, his father had died
and his mother died and his father got another job because he believed that this
pedophile who had abused him for seven years, convinced him that his parents
didn't love him anymore."'
While child-victim stories were a prominent feature of the New York debate, they
were notably lacking in the visual detail evident in the federal debate. Legislators
offered fewer physical descriptions and graphic details that might have added to the
richness of the narratives. In addition, other than the Stayner story, legislators told
terse narratives, sometimes even withholding a victim's name. The Stayner case was
quite memorable for its detail, but the detail did not involve the child's physical
victimization; that element was underemphasized.
The New York debate also featured a different variation on the child-victim
107. Id. at 6571 (statement of Sen. Skelos).
108. See, e.g., id. at 6565 (statement of Sen. Skelos).
109. Id. at 6620 (statement of Sen. Skelos); see also id. at 6645 (statement of Sen. Libous)
(referring to "a young lady from Binghamton who was raped and murdered'.
110. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 394 (statement of Mr. Warner).
11. Id. at 324-25 (statement of Mr. Tedisco).
2001]
INDIANA L,4 WJOURNAL
narrative: a first person account. Assemblyman Spano told his own personal story of
childhood abduction, explaining that "I think it's very important that the Legislators
here and the people of this State see and feel through the eyes of a 12-year old the
pain and suffering that I went through."... 2 He proceeded, over the course of six
transcribed pages, to describe how, on his way to purchase milk:
[A man] walked by me and said, "Do you have a cigarette?" And I said, "No."
And he walked on past me and I was paying attention to whatever I was doing
and he had walked up into the woods. When I walked past those woods, he
grabbed me and pulled me into the woods and it continued from that point."'
Spano explained that during the two or three hours he was with this man, the man
tried to do "certain things that are better offjust not announced here."" 4 He recounted
his own careful and successful efforts to convince the man that his family expected
him home; Spano also told of convincing the abductorhe would voluntarily return the
next day." 5 He then detailed the police's fumbled attempts to arrest the man.
According to this account, the perpetratorwas finallycaught, but ultimatelylet go for
lack of proof."6
Spano's story was notable for its restraint. He specifically declined to detail what
acts the man attempted to perform, though he stated that he was not raped or
sodomized. He also did not discuss the identity of the man, where he lived, what he
looked like, and whether he had any prior record. Oddly, despite his stated
justification for telling this story, the narrative did not feature Spano's fear and
suffering to any great extent. It was, instead, a story of two people locked in a mental
battle. The power of Spano's story lay not in its detail, or its horror, but rather in the
very fact that a fellow legislator was exposing himself, offering an intimate account
of victimization. One can imagine that the chamber fell silent as members listened
sympathetically. 17
The most incongruous child victimization story was told by an opponent of
Megan's Law. Seeking to establish his credentials as a good, caring father,
Assemblyman Sullivan described his daughter's day on the bus:
I understand the emotion. I have daughters. I understand the emotion that goes
through people's minds. My daughter one time couldn't reach the rope on the bus
and the bus driver wouldn't stop the bus and took her about a mile away from her
home and made her walk back. I went down to the bus garage and thank God they
wouldn't tell me who that man was or I wouldn't be here today, I would be in a
jail somewhere."'
112. Id. at 341 (statement of Mr. Spano).
113. Id. at 342.
114. Id. at 343.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 346.
117. Because this study was based on a transcribed record, the actual response of fellow
legislators cannot be established. This shortfall evidences some costs associated with studying
legislative rhetoric in its written form.
118. Id. at 294 (statement of Mr. Sullivan).
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As this narrative reflects, countering powerful stories of abuse can be difficult.
Stacked up against the horrors set out by some of his colleagues, Sullivan's tale read
as parody.
New York legislators told other stories that did not involve victimization. On
multiple occasions, legislators spun idyllic tales of a simpler and safer life. Senator
Marcellino waxed nostalgic:
I remember a time when [parents] could allow [their children] to play in the front
of their house in the front yard and feel free. I remember a time when you could
allow your child to walk to school or walk to the local playground and not worry
about it. I remember a time when we didn't need to lock fences and lock our gates
and lock our doors to our homes. I remember a time when we didn't need burglar
alarms in our homes." 9
Assemblyman Robach recalled that "[w]hen I was a child... I went out all day,
grabbed my bike, my ball and glove, and was gone pretty much all day in our
neighborhood and people knew that it was safe."' 0 Senator Jones "lived in a home a
block and a half from a lovely lake in Rochester and a beach that my four children
walked to almost daily once they learned to swim, not always with their mother
because there were always neighborhood people there.' 2' These were first-person
narratives, sepia-toned memories of a time gone by. Ironically, in the New York
debate, these nostalgic stories were more detailed and visually complete than the
child-victim stories. Victim narratives were terse, unadorned stories of abuse; stories
of the past were florid and sentimental.
2. Statistical Claims
Legislatures prominently featured arguments based on numerical, or similar
research-based evidence, in both the federal and New York Megan's Law debates. In
Congress, legislators focused on a variety of disparate statistics to establish the need
for new legislation. First, legislators sought to establish that child victimization was
a widespread problem. Although legislators proved this principally by anecdotal
evidence, several garnished their stories with statistical data. Citing the Children's
Trust Fund of Texas, Representative Jackson-Lee asserted that in 1995, over 50,000
Texas children suffered child abuse or neglect." Focusing on a different sample,
Representative Ramstad stated that 114,000 children were the victims of attempted
abductions in 1988 and 4600 children actually disappeared."z Senator Hutchison of
Texas claimed that "[t]wenty percent of those in State prisons convicted of violent
crimes-65,000 people-report having victimized a child."'2"
In addition to establishing the scope of the current crisis, legislators explained that
sex offenders were aparticularlyproblematic group. For instance, both Representative
119. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6586 (statement of Sen. Marcellino).
120. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 370 (statement of Mr. Robach).
121. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6659-60 (statement of Sen. Jones).
122. 142 CONG. REc. 10,313 (1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
123. 139 CONG. REc. 31,251 (1993) (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
124. 142 CoNG. REc. 18,765-66 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
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Dunn and Representative McCollum suggested that researchproved sex offenders had
a higher rate of recidivism than the population at large. These legislators did not offer
specific statistics or source cites for their claims. Instead, they couched these
arguments in broader, rhetorical terms. Dunn, for instance, argued that "[t]he rate of
recidivism for these crimes is astronomical because these people are compulsive."'"
Similarly, McCollum argued that "history shows us that people who commit these
kind of crimes are likely to get out ofjail and commit them again."' 26 Some legislators
offered hard data on recidivism, however. Senator Hutchison stated, for instance, that
"we know that more than 40 percent of convicted sex offenders will repeat their
crimes.""127
Other legislators focused particularly on child sex offenders. Some spoke of this
research generally, explaining that "studies have shown that child sex offenders are
some of the most notorious repeat offenders."' 28 Representative Lofgren, a liberal
Congresswoman who supported Megan's Law, cited specific research, including a
Minnesota study and a California study she herself commissioned, to show that
rehabilitation of child sex offenders had a low degree of success.2 9 Representative
Ramstad noted that "[a] study of imprisoned child sex offenders found that 74 percent
had a previous conviction for another child sex offense" and asserted that a second
(also unnamed) study "showed that the average child sex offender molests 117
children."' 30 Senator Gramm compared recidivism rates, arguing that
[t]he probability that someone who is convicted of being a sexual predator,
especially if it is a crime against a child, committing that crime again is estimated
to be 10 times higher than the probability that an armed robber who is
apprehended, convicted, and sent to prison will commit the act of armed robbery
again.1
3 1
Representative Jackson-Lee summarized the data in a particularly appealing
soundbite, saying "[i]t is a known fact that the scientific community has concluded
that most pedophiles cannot control themselves."' 32
125. 140 CONG. REC. 22,520 (1994) (statement of Rep. Dunn) (referring apparently to
"sexual predators" generally).
126. 142 CONG. REC. HI 1,134 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum)
(referring apparently to sexual offenses generally).
127. 142 CONG. REc. 18,766 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
128. 139 CONG. Rc. 31,252 (1993) (statement ofRep. Grams). Presumably, Representative
Grams was saying that the recidivism rate of child sex offenders is notoriously high. It might
be more consistent with the general tone ofthe debate, with its focus on famous cases, if Grams
meant that most notorious repeat criminal offenders are sex offenders.
129. 142 CONG. REC. 10,335 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
130. 139 CONG. REc. 31,251 (1993) (statement of Rep. Ramstad). A few minutes after the
statement of Representative Ramstad, Representative Fish repeated the same recidivism rate
of seventy-four percent. Id. at 31,252 (statement of Rep. Fish).
131. 142 CONG. REc. 7748 (1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
132. 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,134 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
Representative Jackson-Lee presumably believed that through hard spiritual work, some
pedophiles could control themselves. She stated that the bill would not hurt those who had
"made amends, someone who has sought forgiveness and repentance, someone who is born
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The most dramatic statistics were presented by Representative Doman of California.
Rather than using numerical data to show the scope, or intractability, of the child
sexual abuse problem, he used numbers to stake out an ideological position about
homosexuality.
[Tihere is [sic] no heterosexual young men being contacted by women. There are
no women predators to speak of .... There is no lesbian, no heterosexual woman
who pray [sic] on children. We cannot even find statistical data. This is basically
a male homosexual problem, and the child molesters of the heterosexual variety
are usually drunken disgusting stepfathers who are dismissing theirwife and going
after her daughter from another marriage. Take out that chunk and take out the
numbers and prorate these cohorts, since there is only about three-quarters of a
percent of lesbians .... and 1 percent male homosexuals, and the rate of male
pedophilia, homosexual pedophilia one makes is I 1 to I over heterosexual
pedophiles."'
Doman made no effort to link these claims to anyparticular legislative remedy; he was
simply explaining his view of the country's child-molestation problem.
New York legislators also relied on statistics to establish the need for new sex-
offender regulations. For instance, New York legislators showed the extent of the
existing social crisis by citing rates of child sexual abuse. Senator Paterson asserted
that child sexual abuse is estimated to injure as many as one in seven girls and one in
twelve boys.'34 Assemblyman Spano cited statistics from the National Center for Child
Abuse and Neglect showing a 286% increase in the number of sexually abused
children between 1980 and 1986.'" Similarly, legislators discussed recidivism rates
for child sexual offenders. Assemblyman Feldman offered detailed data, for instance,
showing a recidivism rate of thirty to forty percent for adults who "molest" boys, and
a ten to twenty-nine percent rate for adults who "molest" girls.'36 He also cited a
recidivism rate of from seven to thirty-five percent for those who commit rape. 137
Another legislator cited statistics showing that the disproportionately high recidivism
rate among pedophiles was because these individuals continued to reoffend even as
they aged.
3 8
In New York, unlike Congress, legislators openly challenged some of the research
offered by Megan's Law proponents. In one case, New York Senator Leichter
again." Id. Pedophilia is thus treated as a sinful sexual choice that religion could address. This
perspective appears similar to the view of homosexuality held by many modem institutional
religious groups. E.g., Jeffrey L. Sheler, Homosexuality Doctrines, U.S.NEws &WORLDREP.,
July 16, 1990, at 55 (stating that Southern Baptists view homosexuality as a sin, and that
homosexuals can "receive forgiveness and victory through personal faith in Jesus Christ"). Not
surprisingly, then, one representative explicitly linked pedophilia with male homosexuality. See
infra text accompanying note 133.
133. 142 CONG. REc. 17,114 (1996) (statement of Rep. Doman).
134. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6573 (statement of Sen. Paterson).
135. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 347-48 (statement of Mr. Spano).
136. Id. at 304 (statement of Mr. Feldman).
137. Id.
138. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6616 (statement of Sen. Skelos) (asserting that forty
percent ofpedophiles recidivate and that, unlike other offenders, the desire to commit the crime
does not diminish with age).
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questioned the pedophile recidivism rate, asking to see the study.'39 He then pushed
one step further, challenging whether the recidivismrate attributed to pedophiles was
equally applicable to the many other offenders included within the scope of Megan's
Law.' Supporters of the bill were plainly on the defensive with respect to statistical
claims. One legislator preempted potential criticism of his data, arguing that the recent
increase in child assaults was "not just reporting."''
Perhaps the most powerful critique of proponents' statistics centered on the issue
of sexual abuse within families. Not a single Megan's Law supporter cited data that
distinguished between familial and nonfamilial abuse. Assemblywoman Clark, herself
a supporter of Megan's Law, argued that most abusers would never come within the
ambit of the law:
[TJhe majority of sexual abuse and assault takes place at the hands of a family
member. Yet, the statistics show very, very seldom do you find a family member
convicted of sexual assault and abuse. Megan's Law is not going to solve this
problem. I am very concerned that only a small segment of the population will be
affected by this law."'
Senator Paterson also addressed this gap, stating that in-home child sexual assault was
at least as common as stranger, or neighbor, child sexual assault. 43 He questioned the
extent to which community notification would resolve the widespread familial child
sexual abuse problem.'"
While statistics and studies were used in both Congress and the New York
legislature, the statistics offered in Congress were more diffuse. Theyrelated, at times,
to sexual assault, child sexual assault, abduction, child abuse, and child victimization
generally. The debate in New York featured a heightened focus on statistics relating
to child sexual abuse. Legislators overtly challenged the validity of some statistical
claims while simultaneously questioning whether the law, as written, was well-suited
to resolving the problems evidenced by these numbers.
3. Devaluation of Offenders
A third tactic used to justify Megan's Law dealt not with evidence of an existing
crisis, but rather with the diminished value of the regulated parties. Legislators made
linguistic choices that worked to dehumanize individuals convicted ofsexual offenses.
Particularly within the federal congressional debate, legislators repeatedly employed
language suggesting that offenders were less worthy of humane treatment. The single
most common dehumanizing term used to describe convicted sex offenders was
139. See id. at 6616-17 (statement of Sen. Leichter).
140. See id.
141. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 370 (statement of Mr. Robach). This assertion,
backed with no evidence, was notable principally because nobody had suggested that the
increase was just reporting.
142. Id. at 398 (statement of Ms. Clark).
143. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105i at 6572-73 (statement of Sen. Paterson).
144. Id. at 6572.
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"sexual predators."'4 It was used as a metaphor, comparing the actions of animals that
hunt and kill other animals to sexual offenders' pursuit and sexual victimization of
children."4
The frequent use of this termwas almost inevitable, given the name of one proposed
provision. In 1994, Senator Gorton of Washington suggested an alternative to the
Wetterling Act requiring states to conduct sex-offender community notification. 4
Gorton entitled this modification the Sexually Violent Predators Act.' Mere
discussion and reference to Gorton's proposal generated multiple references to
"sexual predators."' 49 Indeed, use of the term occurred numerous times within the U.S.
congressional debate and discussion of the federal Megan's Law."' °
Other legislators used similarly dehumanizing language. Senator Dole described the
man who raped and killed Megan Kanka as "the beast who committed this horrendous
crime."'' Senator Hutchison called sex offenders "monsters.""5 Perhaps the most
powerful dehumanizing rhetoric was Representative Schumer's colorful description
of the sex offender's ritual: "No matter what we do, the minute they get back on the
street, many of them resume their hunt for victims, beginning a restless and
unrelenting prowl for children, innocent children to molest, abuse, and in the worst
cases to kill."'5 Schumer thus suggested that sexual offenders were wily and
dangerous, like wolves.
This tactic of devaluation was less common within the New York debate.
Nonetheless, these sorts of terms surfaced on several occasions." Assemblyman
Tedisco, for instance, declared that"repeat sexual predators, especially those thatprey
145. Use of this term is by no means limited to sex offenders. Juvenile delinquents, for
instance, are frequently referred to as "superpredators." E.g., PETER ELKANN,
SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAw 10 (1999). Before
1990, the term "predator," in a sexual sense, was typically found "in the literature of crime
fiction and true crime, where it appeared extensively in book titles and blurbs, alongside
phrases implying primitivism, animal savagery, and hunting." JENKINS, supra note 2 1, at 193-
94.
146. JENKINS, supra note 21, at 193.
147. Sexually Violent Predators Act, S. 2363, 103d Cong. (1994).
148. Id.
149. Legislative rhetoric can have consequences that ripple well beyond the legislature itself.
For instance, Kansas's decision to name their sexual offender commitment bill the Sexually
Violent Predator Act, resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court using the terms "predator" and
"predatory" thirty-two times in its review of the law. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997).
150. E.g., 142 CONG. REc. 10,312 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (declaring that "we
need to do all we can to stop these predators"); id. at 7747-48 (statement of Sen. Gramm); 140
CONG. REC. 22,700 (1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
151. 140 CONG. REc. 21,448 (1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
152. 142 CONG. REc. 18,766 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
153. Id. at 10,312 (statement ofRep. Schumer). In a similar vein, Representative McCollum
suggested that "sexual predators are remarkably clever and persistently transient." 142 CONG.
REc. HI 1,134 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
154. Assemblywoman John offered an example of a kinder, gentler hostility, calling sex




on children, are the human equivalent of toxic waste."'55 In a similar, if slightly less
hostile vein, Assemblyman Healy implored his colleagues not to "give the protection
to the animals, don't give it to the people exploiting children, protect the children."'
B. Discussion of the Law's Benefits
Federal legislators, with their emphasis on the need for new sex-offender
regulations, spent relatively little time arguing the virtues of the Megan's Law
proposal itself. New York legislators invested somewhat more time focusing on the
benefits of the bill. Legislators inboth jurisdictions looked primarily attwo supposed
benefits of the provision: improved child safety and the reclamation of Megan
Kanka's life.
1. Increased Child Safety
The primary argument offered on behalf of the federal Megan's Law provisions was
that it would reduce victimization of children. This claim was hardly surprising since
one might expect this to be one chief purpose of the bill. What was remarkable,
however, was the way in which legislators sought to prove this claim.
Rather than cite studies or statistics about the efficacy of registration and
notification laws,1" or a flock of success stories from states that had adopted these
laws, federal legislators established the utility of Megan's Law by reference to the
Megan Kanka story itself. The most common method for arguing the efficacy of
Megan's Law was a single assertion: had the law been in place before Megan Kanka's
murder, she would not have been killed. Different legislators expressed varying levels
of certitude of this assertion. During the 1994 debates, shortly after her murder,
several legislators, perhaps understanding the seemingly speculative nature of the
claim, stated that she might still be alive.' As Senator Biden put it, "had we passed
the registry law. . . maybe, just maybe, young Megan would be alive today."'5
Others felt more confident of the legislation's effectiveness, asserting that she would
probably still be alive."6 Senator Gorton argued, "Had such a [notification] provision
been in effect in the State of New Jersey, the recent notorious and terribly regrettable
155. Id. at 417 (statement of Mr. Tedisco)..
156. I'd. at 360-61 (statement of Mr. Healey).
157. Legislators in Congress, at least, might have discussed a 1995 study by the Washington
State Institute for Public Policy. This report indicated that the state's community-notification
law helped the police track sexual offenders but did not significantly reduce recidivism within
this group. Eric Houston, Law Is Helping Police Track Sex Offenders, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 1995, at B2, LEXIS, News Library, SEAPIN File.
158. E.g., 140 CONG. REC. 24,005 (1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (arguing that if
there had been community notification, "just perhaps, just perhaps, Megan Kanka would be
alive today").
159. Id. at 22,786 (statement of Sen. Biden).
160. E.g., id. at 21,448 (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[I]f [the Kanka family] had known about
the criminal history of Megan's killer, there's a good chance that Megan would still have a
childhood and a future.").
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Megan Kanka murder almost certainly would not have taken place." '' Two years
later, however, Representative Zimmer offered the most definitive statement on the
matter. On one occasion, he opined that had the Kankas known their nearby neighbor
was a sex offender, "[t]hey believe, and I believe, that little Megan would be alive
today."'62 On another occasion, Representative Zimmer simply asserted as a matter of
fact that "had [the Kankas] known that an offender lived directly across the street from
them... Megan would be alive today."' 63
Some federal legislators moved beyond the Megan Kanka narrative to establish the
effectiveness of the bill. These representatives argued that Megan's Law would
empower parents and communities to protect themselves by giving them valuable
information."s In addition, some claimed that Megan's Law would improve the
effectiveness of the police by providing them with an investigatory database,' 65 and
by allowing them to offer more complete background checks on applicants for
childcare jobs and scoutmaster positions."
New York legislators also argued that Megan's Law would enhance child safety
within the state. Like their federal counterparts, a few New Yorkers suggested that
Megan's Law would have saved the lives of already dead victims. Senator Skelos, for
instance, quoted Maureen Kanka's assertion that, had the law been in place in New
Jersey, Megan would still be alive. 6 Assemblyman Warner claimed that the four-
year-old victim in his area would have been saved by Megan's Law. 6 These
examples were the exception, however. In the main, New York proponents of
Megan's Law articulated a reasoned basis to believe that Megan's Law would protect
children. Supporters argued, among other things, that it would make offenders afraid
to reoffend because of an increased risk of detection,'69 enhance police detection of
sex offenders,'7" and empower parents and neighborhoods to protect children because
"[p]olice can't be everywhere.''
The New York debate included a specific challenge to this assertion that the world
would be safer with Megan's Law. Assemblywoman Glick stated:
I really, in my heart of hearts, believe that we are providing a false sense of
security to parents, grandparents, maybe aunts and uncles about how they can do
something, they can call a number, they can get some information, and if they can
somehow paint a big letter on a particular house, that will prevent somebody from
harming some kid."
161. Id. at 22,699 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
162. 142 CONG. REc. 10,311 (1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
163. 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
164. 142 CONG. REC. 10,313(1996) (statement ofRep. Jackson-Lee) (suggesting that school
officials, community groups, and others will benefit from dissemination of information).
165. 142 CONG. REC. HI 1,134 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
166. 139 CONG. REc. 31,252 (1993) (statement of Rep. Fish) (regarding child care jobs);
142 CONG. REc. 7747 (1996) (statement of Sen. Granim) (regarding scoutmaster positions).
167. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6571 (statement of Sen. Skelos).
168. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 394 (statement of Mr. Warner).
169. See id. at 363 (statement of Mr. Polonetsky).
170. See id. at 300 (statement of Mr. Feldman).
171. Id. at 370 (statement of Mr. Robach).
172. Id. at 358 (statement of Ms. Glick).
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2. Giving Meaning to Megan's Life
Legislators in both Congress and the New York legislature suggested a more
ethereal benefit to Megan's Law: it would give meaning to Megan Kanka's life. This
claim was premised on the idea that the new legislation was Megan's "legacy... her
gift to all children whose lives will be saved."'73 Adoption of the bill would mean that
Megan's life "will not have been in vain." New York Senator Leibell suggested that
"[little Megan, with her short life has led my colleagues and I here today to deliberate
this bill,"'75 and his colleague, Senator Libous, put it most dramatically: "Ladies and
gentlemen, a simple vote of yes today from the Senate[,] and a vote from the
Assembly[,] and a quick stroke of the pen from Governor Pataki will.., provide a
lasting legacy to a child whose only flaw was her wide-eyed innocence."' 76
C. Discussion of the Law's Problems
Representative Watt of North Carolinaproffered the onlyserious legislative critique
of the federal Megan's Law." His criticisms of the legislation were not particularly
scathing; his restraint may have been, in part, because he recognized that any public
opposition to the bill could be very unpopular and a real political liability. He
explained, "I know that tomorrow when I get the messages off my machine in the
office, there will be a line of messages from people saying... that I have just lost my
mind on this bill. That always happens."'7 Watt's comments were somewhat vague;
he spoke on two occasions and briefly mentioned several concerns about Megan's
Law. On May 7, 1996, he argued that the two problems with the law were that it
presumed people guilty of a crime after they had served their sentence for that offense,
and that it constituted an unjustified incursion into the states' rights to decide whether
they wanted community notification. 79 On September 25, 1996, he proffered three
concerns. First, he contended that the bill should havebeen put through the Committee
on the Judiciary (although he conceded it would have been voted out of committee);
second, he stated that it improperly punished a person for a crime after he had paid his
debt to society; and third, he argued that it created a presumption of guilt, in that every
person ever convicted of a sexual offense was now presumed guilty of new
offenses.8 0 He asserted that the bill's violation of these last two principles was
173. 142 CONG. REC. 10,311 (1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
174. Id. at 10,361 (statement of Rep. Fox); see also id. at 8600 (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee) ("We owe it to Jennifer, Elizabeth, Monique and Megan and all of the others whose lives
have been snuffed out as a result of violent crimes.").
175. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6644 (statement of Sen. Leibell).
176. Id. at 6647 (statement of Sen. Libous).
177. Representative Watt only spoke out against the 1996 Megan's Law provisions.
178. 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt). Indeed,
some media commentators have vilified those who questioned Megan's Law. The New York
Daily News, for instance, referred to Judge Denny Chin, who struck down New York's
Megan's Law, as "the pervert's pal." Rogue's Gallery ofJunkJudges, N.Y. DAILYNEWS, Mar.
31, 1996, at40.
179. 142 CoNG. REc. 10,315 (1996) (statement of Rep. Watt).
180. 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt).
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"simply un-American."''
With respect to Representative Watt's claim that the bill violated the basic
presumption of innocence, Representative McCollum-in a rare instance of one
federal legislator directlyrespondingto a colleague's comment-argued that Wattwas
being a little bit too creative with regard to the presumption of innocence
comments he made. Remember that the person who is registering here... is
somebody who has been convicted of a sexual offense... and this is really part
of what the consequences are that go with being convicted of the acts that are
delineated in the bill. 82
The broader concern that this legislation imposed unjustified burdens on sex
offenders was addressed principally by discussing the need to balance the rights of
convicted offenders against those of children. Some legislators couched this balance
in legalistic terms, citing court precedent purportedly establishing as a matter of law,
that the "rights of potential victims supersede the rights of predators."'' Some noted
that convictions were public knowledge, and that the bill balanced the rights of all
concerned by simply distributing otherwise public information to those who needed
it. "' Others, using their floor speech as an opportunity to preach, were more lyrical:
I think it is important that we stand on the side of civil liberties. But when I think
of an innocent child, one who cannot defend herself or himself, one who cannot
speak for themselves, one who may be torn away from the parent, torn away from
the custodian, tom away from the guardian, who is now with someone who preys
upon them, then my voice raises for that innocent child against that violent sex
offender, against that child abuser, against that murderer. In fact, my voice rises
for all the innocent children in this country.'"3
Legislators addressed Watt's federalism concerns as well. Representative
McCollum contended that the 1996 bill was not a mandate, but rather an
encouragement.'86 Senator Biden argued that states were still permitted flexibility
under the law, but noted the importance of a nationwide system of registration."s
181. Id.
182. Id. (statement ofRep. McCollum). Representative Lofgren, who followedRepresentative
McCollum, concurred with McCollum, stating that "the presumption of innocence ends when
the conviction is obtained." Id. at HI 1,134 (statement of Rep. Lofgren). Lofgren, showing
solidarity with her Democratic colleague Watt, did concede that "it cannot be a popular
position to stand up and speak what you think the Constitution calls out for.... [T]he
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], although I do not agree with him on this issue, has
certainly shown integrity in standing up for what he believes the Constitution requires." Id.
(alteration in original).
183. 142 CONG. REc. 10,311 (1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
184. Id. at 10,314 (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
185. 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,134 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
186. 142 CONG. REC. 10,315 (1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
187. See id. at 7748 (statement of Sen. Biden). Biden's argument about the need for a
nationwide system ofregistration was a rare occasion in which congressional rhetoric was used
in ways that might specifically assist a court reviewing the federal Megan's Law. Although it
is unlikely that the courts would question the power of Congress to create standardized data
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Members of Congress did make passing reference to one common critique of
Megan's Law: the risk of vigilante retaliation against offenders. Although
Representative Watt did not raise this issue in his comments, Representative Lofgren
sought to allay any concerns. Pointing to the successful example of California's
notification law, she argued that vigilantism was not a necessary result of the
legislation.' Representative Cunningham, on the other hand, seemed more sanguine,
asserting that "perhaps a sexual predator's life should be just a little more toxic than
someone else in the American citizenry."'8 9
Unlike Congress, the New York legislature spent a significant amount of time
discussing possible problems with Megan's Law. Critics of the bill offered a more
nuanced attack on the legislation than Representative Watt's generalized claims. For
instance, Senator Patterson argued that because most child sexual assault occurs
within the home, and goes unreported, Megan's Law would have minimal net
benefit. 9 This claim seemed to encompass two criticisms. First, most sexual
offenders would never be subject to registration and notification because they would
not be caught. Second, many sexual abuse victims would not receive any new benefit
from registration and notification, because they were victimized at the hands of
relatives, rather than strangers.
Legislators were also dubious of the law's fundamental assumption that mere notice
would be enough to keep children from danger. One assemblywoman noted that
children often disobey parental restrictions, and feared that placing a house off limits
might create an enticement for children.' Others worried that the existence of the
legislation would actually endanger children by creating an unjustified illusion of
security. 92 Another legislator conceded that registration would reduce crime by
helping police solve crimes; he argued, however, that registration alone-without
notification-would do that job nicely.93
Questions about the constitutionality of the provision were discussed at length
within both the Assembly and Senate. Legislators debated whether the retroactivity
of the bill would implicate Ex Post Facto Clause concerns, 94 and supporters of the bill
collection given the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution's spending power in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), W. Paul Koenig's discussion of the need for a national
database might provide sufficient basis to uphold the law even under the Commerce Clause.
W. Paul Koenig, Does Congress Abuse Its Spending Clause Power by Attaching Conditions
on the Receipt of Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a State's Compliance with "Megan's
Law"?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 721 (1998).
188. See 142 CONG. REC. 10,314 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
189. Id. RepresentativeCunninghamwas notexplicitly endorsing vigilantism, and thephrase
could be seen simply to suggest that community opprobrium was an acceptablepunishment for
sex offenders. Nonetheless, his rhetoric does suggest, at minimum, a lack of concern about this
bill's impact on the life of a sex offender. At most, it is open tolerance for vigilantism.
190. See N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6572 (statement of Sen. Patterson).
191. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 311 (statement of Ms. John).
192. Id. at 397 (statement of Mr. Sullivan); id. at 358 (statement of Ms. Glick).
193. See N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6621 (statement of Sen. Leichter).
194. See, e.g., N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 309-10 (statement of Ms. John)
(questioning bill's constitutionality); id. at 384-86 (statement of Mr. Feldman) (asserting bill
was constitutional).
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responded by noting the inclusion of a severability clause.'"5 In one speech, Senator
Marchi sought to clarify that the bill was gender neutral; "knowing... the quixotic
nature of judicial interpretation[]," he wanted to prevent any future legal attacks on
the legislation. " Not surprisingly, issues of federalism did not arise explicitly in New
York. They did surface implicitly, however. First, on several occasions legislators
suggested that New York was required, by federal law, to adopt a community-
notification provision." These comments made no reference to the fact that the
federal Megan's Law was not an actual mandate, but rather a condition of receiving
a full dose of federal crime-fighting funds. Second, New York legislators argued that,
in order to maintain the state's traditional leadership position in the creation of new
law, the legislature had to move quickly.' They claimed that other states were
moving swiftly to adopt Megan's Law and that the state was at risk of losing its
cutting-edge reputation.'"
One of the most potent criticisms of the bill, utterly absent in the federal debate,
involved the application of Megan's Law to cities and high-density neighborhoods.
A representative from New York City, Assemblyman Sullivan, argued that the bill
would provide little protection for children in cities because: "All any pervert has to
do who lives on my street is hop on the subway and in five minutes he is in another
community where there are children who are going to the store for milk or going to
school."2" Sullivan's argument was taken one step further by a grudging supporter of
the bill, Assemblyman Towns, who suggested that Megan's Law might actually make
some areas more dangerous. He noted that neighborhood pressure, in suburbs and
smaller towns, to exclude convicted sex offenders could result in "warehousing of
these people in certain comrnunities" 2°-namely, high-density cities, where these
individuals would be less noticeable.
In another distinction between the federal and state debates, legislators in New York
expressed worry for those offenders subject to registration and community
notification. Legislators repeatedly brought up concerns about vigilantism, for
instance. 2 They were troubled that individuals might be subject to violence from
angry community members 0 Some were concerned with the stigma engendered by
notification as well as the dangers of erroneous notification. 4 Others argued that the
provision would create a barrier for effective treatment of sex offenders because they
would be unable to integrate into society.0 Couldn't parole provide equally effective
community protection, one legislator wondered.2"
195. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6612 (statement of Sen. Skelos).
196. See id. at 6605-08 (statement of Sen. Marchi).
197. See, e.g., id. at 6588 (statement of Sen. Nozzolino).
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 397 (statement of Mr. Sullivan).
201. Id. at 407-08 (statement of Mr. Towns).
202. See, e.g., id. at 297 (statement of Mr. Sullivan); N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6618
(statement of Sen. Leichter).
203. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 357 (statement of Ms. Glick).
204. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6618 (statement of Sen. Leichter).
205. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 359 (statement of Ms. Glick).
206. See id. at 371-80 (various statements of Mr. Grannis).
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The bill's backers, for the most part, sidestepped these concerns. They did address
the most salient issue, vigilantism. The principle response to this critique of Megan's
Law was a call for law and order: vigilantism would not be tolerated. 7 In any case,
they anticipated that such incidents would be rare.20 8 Despite these more levelheaded
comments, at least one representative articulated the bubbling undercurrent of the
debate, asserting that even if individuals were "wrongly abused in their neighborhoods
... I don't care."2° Proponents also dismissed the suggestion that parole would be an
adequate substitute; supporters instead suggested that Megan's Law would provide
additional support to an overwhelmed parole office.1
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE RHETORIC
Despite the one-sided support for Megan's Law, legislators engaged in an extensive
debate about the law's provisions. This Part critically reviews the rhetoric used in the
Megan's Law legislative debates. First, it considers the consequences of using child-
victim narratives as a form of public-policy argument. Next it discusses the use of
statistical manipulation in making the case for the law. It then shows that the debates
were framed almost entirely in terms of child protection. Finally, it explores implicit
and explicit claims proffered about the demographic impact of Megan's Law.
A. Stories as Public-Policy Claims
Both federal and New York legislators exhibited a preference for advocacy through
storytelling. In the federal debate, virtually all of these stories were child-victim
narratives. Legislators used the storyofMeganKanka's rape andmurder, for example,
to show both that convicted sex offenders do terrible things to children and that the
bill would protect children like Megan. These stories were told in vivid, graphic form,
including minute details like "bearded" men, "specialty" condoms purchased at
"Seductions," and a girl abducted from "her pink bike into a black truck. 2.'
Embedded in these stories were not only tales of childhood innocence but lush images
of dark criminality. It was easy to picture these horrible crimes and, in doing so, to
feel uneasy.
While New York legislators relied less on narrative, they also marbled their
comments with stories. Their child victim stories were somewhat less vivid, however,
and lacked the drama of stories told in Congress. On the other hand, legislators in
New York told more varied stories in the course of their remarks.
Despite the differences in the storytelling approach, the two debates exhibited a
similar infatuation with storytelling as rhetorical trope. Why were stories such an
important tool for legislators? First, narratives are powerful. Humans make sense of
the world through stories and metaphors.' They are also a particularly easy way to
207. See N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6619 (statement of Sen. Skelos).
208. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 301 (statement of Mr. Feldman).
209. Id. at 390 (statement of Ms. Wirth).
210. See, e.g., id. at 384 (statement of Mr. Feldman).
211. Supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
212. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cml. L. REV.
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convey an idea,213 and a uniquely effective method of capturing a listener's
attention.1 4 They also make a more powerful emotional appeal than logical claims"5
because they encourage the listener to humanize a problem. Graphic, detailed
narratives are particularly effective; due to human-cognitive-processing limitations,
vivid stories are easier to recall, and harder to refute, than statistical or logical
claim.
216
Legal rhetoric is thickwith narrative. Judicial opinions begin with a statement of the
facts. This story, posing as an objective recitation of truth, is carefully drawn to lead
to the court's conclusions. 217 A judicial opinion is typically designed to appear
inevitable given the facts.2t Judicial storytelling helps establish that a party is "an
innocent victim or an undeserving malefactor. '21 9 Martha Nussbaum contends that
detailed judicial storytelling can evoke a sense of the moral issue at play in a case.
Discussing Hudson v. Palmer,20 a prisoner suit challenging the propriety of a cell
search, Nussbaum argues:
If we can imagine the items seized in the shakedown search-a photograph, a
letter-we can imagine not only the fact that Palmer possessed these items
legitimately, but also the character of the interest he was likely to have in these
fragile signs of his humanity. We are likely, then, to appreciate more vividly the
malicious character of the intrusion of the guard, whose destruction of a
photograph served no conceivable institutional goal other than intimidation and
humiliation."2
Judicial opinions are "not just 'storytelling' exercises seeking to create dramatic
361, 383 (1996) ("We make sense of the world by ordering it into metaphors, and ultimately
into narratives with familiar structures and conventions-plot, beginning and end, major and
minor characters, heroes and villains, motives, a moral.").
213. Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-understanding: A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEo. L.J. 1845, 1857 (1994) ("Narrative can create
empathy that helps listeners to understand concepts that might be difficult for them to grasp
when conveyed as abstractions.").
214. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 39, at 1006-07 (describing one law scholar's narrative
as "pungen[t]" and 'jarring").
215. See Delgado, supra note 35, at 2440; Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 10(1984).
216. See RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSs, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJuDGmENT 45-61, 123-25 (1980). Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein
pay particular attention to this "availability heuristic," by which individuals estimate the
probability of an event based on how easily it is recalled. Because people can recall vivid
stories particularly easily, Kuran and Sunstein contend that arguments grounded in such story-
based claims are unusually effective at swaying citizens. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 32,
at 706.
217. See Wald, supra note 30, at 13 86-89 (arguing that ajudge "consciously relates a 'story'
that will convince the reader [the case] has come out right").
218. See id. at 1386, 1389.
219. Id. at 1386.
220. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
221. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 1501.
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tension";222 "[e]very judge knows the facts should carry an opinion."'
Likewise, trials are packaged as stories. Trial lawyers create opposing master
narratives, theories of the case, into which they plug the evidence adduced at trialY"
One commentator explained that "[t]he American adversary criminal trial is a
regulated storytelling contest between champions of competing, interpretive
stories." '225 Lawyers use narratives for good reason: they effectively engage and
convince jurors. As Justice Souter noted in a recent dissent, "research redoundingly
proves that the story format is a powerful key to juror decision making."1
226
Legislators tell stories for a variety of reasons. For instance, storytelling can be a
good political strategy for legislators seeking media attention. Legislators who want
their statements to be covered in the press, and particularly on television, must
compete with many other news producers. 7 They need to use rhetoric that appeals
to the media and society at large. The public loves crime narratives; Americans seem
to have a limitless capacity for police dramas, true crime accounts, and gory news
coverage. 8 The media, in turn, love these stories because they draw viewers and
readers. The press prioritizes dramatic stories 9 and makes a concerted effort to cover
particularly terrible crimes." ° The media also have a stake in perpetuating coverage
of these crimes; the Jon Benet Ramsey and O.J. Simpson cases both exemplify the
media's successful efforts to continuously remarket a crime story.
When legislators recount gruesome crime narratives, they assist the media in
reactivating old, popular crime stories. The public has already proven a long-term
interest in the Megan Kanka case, for instance."' When legislators speak out for
Megan's Law by retelling horrible narratives, they make themselves characters in the
underlying crime stories. Their speech sends the message, both explicitly and
implicitly, that their efforts are directly related to the original crimes. For the media
and public, then, the legislative debate is merely the newest twist in an old, compelling
crime saga, a perfect excuse to revisit the riveting, horrific murder that began it all.
There are other reasons, beyond political strategy, that explain the centrality of
storytelling in the Megan's Law debate. For one thing, this type of rhetoric may have
served as legallypermissible retribution against sex offenders. Legislators have a very
222. Patricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1451, 1453 (1995).
223. Wald, supra note 30, at 1389.
224. See RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE 41 (2000); MICHAEL E. TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES 5 (1993).
225. Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory ofAmerican Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 120 (1987).
226. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 307 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIvIL AND CRIMINAL 5
(3d ed. 1997)).
227. See BEST, supra note 58, at 88.
228. See Gary W. Potter & Victor E. Kappeler, Introduction to CONSTRUCTING CRIME:
PERSPECTIVES ON MAKING NEWS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 2-3 (Gary W. Potter & Victor E.
Kappeler eds., 1998).
229. See BEST, supra note 58, at 88.
230. Potter & Kappeler, supra note 228, at 4.
231. A search of the LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File on November 5, 2000, seeking
all documents since July 29, 1997, that included "Megan Kanka" produced over 1000 stories.
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limited ability to punish individuals who have already broken the law. The
Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause3 2 prohibits alegislature from increasing a penalty
on an offender after he has committed a crime. 3 Similarly, the constitutional
prohibition onbills of attainder"' forbids "legislative acts, no matter what their form,
that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial." '235
By interlinking the new laws with child-victim narratives, however, legislators may
have sought a legal means to achieve the social benefits of retribution. Megan's Law
delivers a severe blow to the entire community ofconvicted sex offenders. While most
courts agree that community notification is not punishment in a constitutional sense,236
it is punishment in any common-sense understanding of the word."3 7 It makes an
offender's life more unpleasant. Not only is an offender stripped of anonymity, he is
subject to public censure, and potentially personal violence. One can easily imagine
that the public felt a sense of retributive satisfaction when legislators recounted cases
of victimization and asserted that Megan's Law was enacted in direct response to
these stories. Indeed, given the delays in criminal trials-it took almost three years for
Jesse Timmendequas to be convicted of Megan's murder3S--this legislative
retribution was far swifter than any offered by the courts.
Another reason why legislators may retell victim stories is that by liitng a law to
an individual incident, society may be better able to make sense of the incident.
Legislative rhetoric thus creates coherence out of random evil acts. Legislators
repeatedly asserted that the law insured that these individual victims had not died in
vain. Thus, the rhetoric of Megan's Law transforms Megan's death into a gift and the
bill becomes that narrative's final chapter. The story now ends on a vaguely upbeat
note: one child's death assures the safety of all other children. Like retribution, this
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
233. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,390 (1798) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits enactment of law that "aggravates a crime" or "changes the punishment, and inflicts
a greater punishment").
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
235. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
236. E.g., Roe v. Office ofAdult Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d
367 (N.J. 1995). A minority of courts have held that it is punishment. E.g., Kansas v. Myers,
923 P.2d 1024, 1043 (Kan. 1996). Courts have also held that Megan's Law is not an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. See, e.g., Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 192 (D. Mass.
1998). For an extensive list of court decisions evaluating the constitutionality of state Megan's
Laws, see Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Statutes Authorizing Community Notification of Release of Convicted Sex Offender, 78
A.L.R.STH489 (2000).
237. Symposium, supra note 20, at 65-66 (1997) (comments of Hon. John J. Gibbons,
former Third Circuit judge) (arguing that notification is punishment because it "will affect a
person's ability to find ajob, meet a companion and establish a stable relationship, and initiate
membership in a church"); Telpner, supra note 25, at 2055 (arguing that Megan's Law is
punishment under a "broad, common-sense meaning of the term").
238. Timmendequas was convicted on May 30, 1997. William Glaberson, Man at Heart of
Megan's Law Convicted of Her Grisly Murder, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1997, at Al. He was
sentenced to death on June 20, 1997. William Glaberson, Killer in 'Megan' Case Sentenced
to Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al.
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process allows society to accept, and move on from, a horrible violation.
Finally, storytelling may give voice to an outsider group: children. Children cannot
vote and rarely speak before legislatures. Perhaps as a consequence, they are
especiallyplagued bysocialproblems. They suffer disproportionately frompoverty." 9
And while overall crime rates have been dropping in recent years, violence against
children has not abated.' Children, therefore, could be seen as an "outsider" group,
at least with respect to public policy. Commentators have suggested that one
significant benefit to storytelling is its capacity to give voice to outsider groups."4 Of
course, not all stories empower outsiders. "The dominant group creates its own
stories, as well." ' 2 A child-victim story, particularly when told by a popularly elected
legislator, could be viewed not as an outsider narrative, but rather as the majority's
narrative, reflecting amajoritarian effort to impose greater burdens upon an offending
minority.243 Nonetheless, it is at least arguable that the use of narratives in the
Megan's Law legislative debate may have functioned as a uniquely powerful way to
convey the experience of children.
The use of stories in legislative debate is not unproblematic, however. First,
storytelling is an argumentative method that deals with the single case. It is sometimes
difficult to strain a single, definitive meaning from a story. For instance, Megan's
murder could be read as the story of a parent who lacked critical information about
neighborhood safety; the tale of a bad parent who did not properly supervise her
seven-year-old daughter; or the account of a media that oversexualized children.
Depending how one interprets Megan's story, then, it may prove the need for
community notification, state supervision and training of all parents, or censorship of
the media. Unlike logical claims, which are putatively designed to convey a single
meaning, the interpretation of a story may depend more on a listener's preconceptions
than the content of the narrative itself.
Another difficulty with storytelling as legislative argument is that it has the potential
to stifle debate; it is very difficult to disagree with an emotional and horrifying
story.2" What was the proper response to a legislator who explained that she
239. Almost twice as many children are in poverty, as a percentage matter, as the nation's
population as a whole. See America's UnfinishedAgenda: The PoorAre Still There, and Need
Helping, ECONOMIST, May 20,2000, at 24.
240. Gayla Margolin & Elana B. Gordis, The Effects ofFamily and Community Violence on
Children, 51 ANN. REV. PsYcH. 445, 446 (2000).
241. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity,
"Blunders," and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REV. 69, 88 (1996)
("Stories can alter public debate by attacking and questioning the underlying stories that we
tell about public policy and the law. Stories can alter public policy by adding aspects to the
stories currently being told, or by introducing questions that are not being discussed.").
242. Delgado, supra note 35, at 2412.
243. Cf. Bandes, supra note 212, at 410-11 (suggesting that both rapist and rape victim are
"outsiders"). One could even make the argument that use of the child's story is a form oftheft,
the appropriation of a few families' pain in the aid of a tough crime ideology. Cf. Trina Grillo
& Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making
Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-Isms), 1991 DuKE L.J. 397, 405-10
(discussing how some African-Americans mayhearwhites discussing the power of racism and
feel that this is an appropriation of pain).
244. In a similar vein, Farber and Sherry argue that it is difficult to disagree with personal
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supported the bill because Megan was killed? Legislators could not have argued that
Megan was not killed. They could have claimed that Megan's Law would not have
prevented Megan's murder, but this argument required a direct challenge to the
victim's parents, who asserted that community notification would have saved Megan's
life. They could have tried to ignore the proponent's story, or, like New York Senator
Leichter, argue that the recitation of a story was a mere appeal to emotion.24
Legislators opposing the bill were left few attractive options.
Ironically, the "true" story of Megan Kanka is open to factual dispute. At the core
of supporters' claims for Megan's Law was the assumption that Richard and Maureen
Kanka were in fact unaware that a sex offender lived nearby. Yet this assumption may
not be true. Several of the Kankas' neighbors stated that they knew a sex
offender-albeit, not Timmendequas himself-lived in the house where Megan was
killed.2' Moreover, they asserted that Maureen Kanka admitted she knew that this
individual lived there.4 The Kankas fervently denied this claim 48 One neighbor was
very critical of what he saw as an intentional campaign of denial within the
neighborhood:
When I read that in the papers [that neighbors had no knowledge that three sex
offenders were living on the block], I was pissed. They all knew what Joey Cifelli
did. It was common knowledge. How could those neighbors go to bed at night and
sleep and say that they didn't know that he was a pervert?249
If the Kankas did know that a sex offender lived next door, and if the bill's supporters
were accurate in claiming that notification would allow good parents to protect their
children, the resulting implication would have been that the Kankas were partially
culpable for Megan's death. In addition, it would have made the Kankas' advocacy
for Megan's Law look downright deceitful. Whether or not the Kankas knew their
neighbor was a sex offender, the remarkable thing is that not a single legislator was
willing to question the Kankas' account. No doubt, a proponent of the bill would have
taken great offense at such a challenge. Yet legislators' failure to confront these
underlying assumptions show the difficulty in challenging arguments framed as
stories. To attack the basic terms of the Megan Kanka narrative was a political
impossibility.' 0
stories because "it's hard to say anything critical about the story without implicating the
storyteller." FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 39, at 89.
245. See note 105.
246. Tim O'Brien, WouldMegan's Law Have SavedMegan?, 145 N.J. L.J. 109 (1996). The
person who lived in the home, Joey Cifelli, had been previously convicted of carnal abuse,
sodomy, and impairing the morals of a nine-year-old girl. Id.
247. Id.
248. Donna Murphy Weston, Megan's Law Based on Fallacy. Did Parents Know About a
Molester?, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), July 9, 1996, at A 1, LEXIS, News Library, NJREC
File. Richard Kanka responded that the New Jersey Law Journal wanted to "undermine what
me [sic] and Maureen have been doing all these years." Id.
249. O'Brien, supra note 246, at 109.
250. The Megan Kanka narrative was a particularly powerful and troubling story. It is
certainly possible that some narratives-those involving less emotionally charged themes, or
those that did not benefit from extensive media attention--could be effectively refuted within
2001]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Even accepting that the use of narrative has value, however, legislators were very
selective in their storytelling choices. Legislators in both Congress and New York
ignored the stories of victimizers. To be sure, they mentioned offenders in the context
of their crimes. They did not, however, attempt to explain how these offenders became
abusers. A few legislators observed that many offenders were themselves sex-abuse
victims s. but they framed these observations in terms of individual narratives.
Similarly, legislators did not present accounts of offenders battling with rehabilitation
or an irresistible compulsion to molest, or stories of offenders victimized by local
vigilantes. 2 Only Megan's Laws' supporters appropriated the power of narratives;
in a debate centered on stories of victims, opponents' logic-based arguments lacked
rhetorical vibrancy.
The use of stories in legislative debate is neither purely good nor purely bad. The
decision to recount victim stories may yield positive social, as well as political,
benefits. On the other hand, they must be used carefully, because they have the
potential to stifle dialogue. What is particularly troubling about storytelling in the
Megan's Law debate was that the stories presented a one-sided picture of the
world-a picture that had already gained public acceptance prior to the debate. While
the use of child narratives proved that legislators watched the same gory news
coverage as everyone else, it did little to educate the public to the varied, and
complicated, causes of these incidents.
B. Uncritical Statistical Claims
Although secondary to narratives, arguments based on statistics played an important
role in both the federal and New York Megan's Law debate. As with storytelling, the
role of statistics varied between the two venues. In the federal debate, statistics were
offered to prove both the severe extent of the sex-crime problem and the high
recidivism rate for these offenders. Rarely did they shed much light on whether, or
how, Megan's Law would address these concerns.253
a political debate. In the case of Megan Kanka, for instance, the countemarrative of the
Kankas' neighbors might have had greater impact had it surfaced in the first weeks after the
incident.
251. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 10,314 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
252. Even at the time of these debates, legislators could have found cases of offenders
victimized as the result of community-notification laws. A 1993 study of Washington's
notification law showed that twenty-six percent of sex offenders covered by the law suffered
harassment. Katherine Seligman, Sex Offender Branding: Bad, Good, or Ugly? Public
Notification Alerts Public, Hounds Ex-Cons, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1994, at Al, LEXIS,
News Library, PHNXGZ File. One early example of vigilante activity involved the well
publicized case of Joseph Gallardo, whose family's home was burned by angry neighbors.
Karen Alexander et al., Child Rapist Says He'll Return to Home Despite Arson, SEATTLE
TIvES, July 13, 1993, at Al, LEXIS, News Library, SEATTM File. Legislators also declined
to tell stories of "collateral damage," cases where innocent victims were beaten because angry
neighbors mistook them for convicted offenders. See, e.g., Barry Meier, 'Sexual Predators'
Find Sentence May Last Past Jail, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al.
253. Identifying a statistical "reality" is an impossible task. Different studies, asking
different questions, can produce different results. Also, it is difficult to evaluate the success of
nonstandardized processes like rehabilitation of sex offenders, since these processes will vary
[Vol. 76:315
2001] MAKING A CASE FOR MEGAN'S LA W 353
For instance, legislators cited a variety of statistics relating to rates of victimization.
Representative Jackson-Lee described the problem as high rates of child abuse and
neglect' while Representative Ramstad framed it as high rates of child abduction."
Numbers have a way of dazzling the listener, and it is worth parsing these statistics
slowly. For example, what sorts of incidents constitute the 50,000 cases of "abuse and
neglect' cited by Jackson-Lee?" 6 According to the Children's Trust Fund of Texas,
the source of this number, abuse and neglect are defined as
a person's action or failure to take action which has an adverse effect on a child's
physical or mental health or welfare. Abuse includes physical, sexual, mental, or
emotional harm. Neglect includes failure to provide a child with adequate care,
food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or placing a child in a potentially
dangerous situation."
The degree to which this broad classification exceeds the scope of Megan's Law is
virtually self-evident. Megan's Law would do nothing to protect children from
irresponsible parents, for instance.
Representative Ramstad cited a study indicating that, in 1988, 114,600 children
were victims of attempted abduction, and 3200-4600 of actual abduction.' 8 The
numbers appear to have come from a 1990 study commissioned by the U.S. Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention."9 While these numbers seem daunting,
the study carefully warns that the definition of "abduction" "is far broader than the
stereotype many people have when they think of stranger kidnapping." '26 It includes
cases involving minimal coerced movement, exceedingly brieftime of detention, and
such "nonfamily" perpetrators as acquaintances and babysitters.261 The report
contrasts abduction statistics with the number of "stereotypical kidnapping" cases, in
which a child was taken a large distance, kept overnight, ransomed, or murdered. 2
Using this "stereotypical kidnapping" statistic-the one the authors believed best
based on the type of rehabilitation used, and the nature of the sex offenders' pathologies.
Similarly, it is hard to quantify broad categories of crime like "abuse" or even "sexual abuse."
As Joel Best establishes, there is no agreed-upon definition of "child sex abuse." BEST, supra
note 58, at 83-85. While some believe it includes offenses like the seduction ofa fourteen-year-
old girl by a fourteen-year-old boy, others limit the categories to adults seducing children, or
adults producing child pornography. Id. What is certain, however, is that statistics relating to
abduction, pedophilia, and sex offenses are both plentiful and contradictory. See, e.g., id.; R.
Karl Hanson, The Science of Sex Offenders: Risk Assessment, Treatment and Prevention, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 50 (1998).
254. See supra text accompanying note 122.
255. See supra text accompanying note 123.
256. See supra text accompanying note 122.
257. TEX. A&M UNIv. PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INST., 1995 STATEWIDE CHILD SURVEY
ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY, http://www.ctf.state.tx.us/html (last visited Feb. 9, 2001).
258. See supra text accompanying note 123.
259. DAvID FINKELHOR ET AL, MIssING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY
CHILDREN IN AMERICA: FIRsTREPORT: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICSNATIONALINCIDENCE
STUDIEs 4, 10 (1990).
260. Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 67.
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represented the public's understanding of child abductions 263-- there were 200 to 400
actual abductions in 1988. While this number may be unacceptably high, and a valid
cause for concern, it is easy to see the rhetorical advantage of citing 114,000 cases
rather than 400. Unfortunately, this larger number is deceptive. Legislators implicitly
framed the crisis addressed by Megan's Law in terms of particular, gruesome cases;
to the extent that legislators suggested that 114,000 such child murders were attempted
each year, they misled their colleagues and the public.
Legislators also discussed high recidivism rates. Some legislators spoke of
recidivism rates of sex offenders generally,2 while most focused principally on the
reoffense rate of child sex offenders. 5 While distinctions were sometimes made
between generic "sex offenders" and "child sex offenders," little or no distinction was
offered between different sorts of sex offenses. It is unclear exactly what offenses
these statistics refer to. For instance, within some jurisdictions, the promotion of
prostitution is considered a sex offense.2 If these offenders have a high recidivism
rate, that is more likely due to a passion for money than a fetish for child abuse.
Legislators did not indicate whether open lewdness, indecent exposure, prostitution
or other types of lower grade sex offenses--crimes that would not be covered by the
federal Megan's Law-were included in their offense and recidivism rates.
In the federal debate, nobody questioned the statistics supporting Megan's Law. In
part, this absence of criticism reflected an absence of critics within Congress. Given
the onslaught of horrifying stories and the attending tone of moral indignation, a
critique of supporters' statistical claims might have been treated akin to Holocaust
denial.267 Nonetheless, given the nature of the statistics that were presented, listeners
might have benefitted from closer scrutiny of supporters' claims.
To a lesser extent, this sort of loose play with statistics also surfaced in the New York
debates. There, the only statistics mentioned seemed to relate to child sexual offenses.
Gone were generic references to "victimization" and "abuse." Still, the statistics that
were offered did not provide clear grounds for this particular law. For instance,
Assemblyman Spano indicated that child sexual abuse rates were on the rise;26 he did
not indicate whether there was a similar rise in adult sex abuse that received
comparable treatment underMegan's Law. The statistics offered were underinclusive;
they offered a basis for a law that regulated child sex offenders, but not the broader
provisions of New York law that included offenders who victimized adults or who
abused children in nonsexual ways.
Unlike the federal legislators, however, New York critics of Megan's Law
263. See id. at xii.
264. See text accompanying notes 125-27.
265. See text accompanying notes 128-32.
266. Alabama's Megan's Law, for instance, includes individuals convicted of promoting
prostitution in the second degree. ALA. CODE § 13A- 11-200 (1994). That prostitution provision,
in turn, covers any individual who runs a prostitution operation with two or more employees.
ALA. CODE § 13A-12-112 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
267. The parallel between the problem of child sexual assaults and the Holocaust was drawn
implicitly in the New York Senate where one Senator invoked the phrase, oft used about the
Holocaust, "We must never forget." N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6588 (statement of Sen.
Nozzolio).
268. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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challenged the use of statistics. For example, on several occasions legislators brought
up the issue of family sex abuse.269 For some, the high rate of family sex abuse, and
the low rate of conviction among these abusers, proved that Megan's Law would not
affect most sex offenders. For others, this problem cut to the core ofthe Megan's Law
premise: if most sex abuse is occurring in the home, neighborhood notification would
not address the problem.27 0 In either case, critics noted, the fact that most sex abuse
cases occurred in the home undermined claims about the efficacy of Megan's Law.
Supporters of the bill heard these critiques. They conceded that Megan's Law might
not be a panacea. This may explain, in part, why fewer New York legislators claimed
that one or another specific child would have been saved by the bill. Nonetheless,
supporters wanted the state to take some action. As one explained: "This bill isn't
going to be the end all and this legislation isn't going to make my son 100 percent safe
or anyone else's son or daughter 100 percent safe, but it's a beginning, it's protection,
and it's awareness, and it arms us."2 '
In both venues, legislators used statistics to create the sense that a child sexual-
assault crisis was sweeping the nation and that Megan's Law would address this crisis.
Yet the statistics, once read closely, often failed to establish the alleged seriousness
of the problem. In addition, they documented problems well beyond the scope of the
proposed legislation. Legislators made no effort to tailor their statistical evidence to
the bill under consideration and, in the federal debates at least, these disingenuous
claims went unchallenged.
C. Child Protection as an Issue Frame
In addition to sharing two particularly salient argumentative
techniques-storytelling and statistics-both debates framed Megan's Law almost
entirely in terms of child protection. This was expected given the name of the bill, but
it did not accurately reflect the true scope of Megan's Law. Neither the federal nor the
New York Megan's Law was limited only to offenders who victimize children.2'
Legislators' decision to frame the debate in such limited terms must, therefore, be seen
as a conscious rhetorical tactic.273
In the federal debate, this child protection frame was pervasive. For instance,
legislators repeatedly cited statistics relating to child sexual-abuse rates and child
sexual-offender recidivism rates. Not a single federal legislator provided any data
regarding sex offenses against adults. While there was some discussion of overall sex-
offender recidivism rates, most legislators focused principally on the reoffense rate
of child sex offenders. Representative Lofgren, the only legislator to cite particular
research on rehabilitation, limited her discussion exclusively to pedophiles.
269. See supra text accompanying note 190.
270. See supra text accompanying note 190.
271. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 367-68 (statement of Ms. Destito). Similarly,
Assemblywoman Clark noted that Megan's Law would not solve the larger problem of family
sexual abuse and assault but nonetheless supported the bill. Id. at 398 (statement ofMs. Clark).
272. See supra text accompanying note 266.
273. It is, of course, possible that none of the representatives debating the laws actually
knew their scope. Since the bills' sponsors participated in the debates, however, it begs
credulity to suggest that nobody was aware of the unjustifiably narrow discussion frame.
20011
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Legislators could have presented data on recidivism rates of sex offenders generallr,
such data is available." Alternatively, they might have tried to link the statistics about
children to overall rates of sex victimization. Instead, almost all data referred
exclusively to child sex offenses.
This focus on children extended to the use of stories in the federal debate. The laws
were named after children. Again and again legislators told the story ofMegan Kanka
or other high-profile child victims. Yet in the course of all of this storytelling, no
legislator offered a story of an adult victim. When legislators sought to prove that
Megan's Law would work, they again turned to Megan's story, arguing that the bill
would have saved her life. They argued that the bill might empower the community
to protect other children. Legislators did not make the broader claim that the bill
would protect the entire community against victimization. Surely, for example, a
legislator might have offered a real, or hypothetical, story of a woman who,
unbeknownst to her, was dating a rapist and who ultimately fell victim to his crime.2 "5
Instead, legislators left stories of adult victims untold.
Even a discussion of civil rights focused entirely on children. When proponents of
Megan's Law discussed the law's effects on offenders, they argued that offenders'
rights should be balanced against the benefits to children. For whatever reasons,
legislators chose not to frame the issue in broader terms. Certainly, they could easily
have argued that victims' rights outweighed those of offenders. Repeatedly, federal
legislators avoided making broad claims for Megan's Law; every argument was
framed in terms of child protection.
The New York debates were little different. In their discussion of research and data,
New York legislators referred exclusively to child sexual abuse. Similarly, New York
legislators' storytelling focused almost entirely on children.7 Megan Kanka, Steven
Stayner, and Sherry Lindsay,2' among others, were all featured in the debate. In
274. See generally, Hanson, supra note 253.
275. Perhaps one reason why legislators eschewed real adult-victim narratives was that
victims did not want their stories publicized. One New York state senator implied as much,
stating that "this bill does protect as well the many women out there who maybe did not appear
on the front page of a paper nor would they have wanted their name or face there but,
nonetheless, have been a victim of these sexual predators." N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at
6660 (statement of Sen. Jones). This fear for reputation, however, did not stop legislators'
graphic descriptions of child rape and murder.
276. There was one exception to this focus on child-victim stories in New York. Several
legislators mentioned the case of Arthur Shawcross who, on parole for killing two children,
went on to kill eighteen women. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 401 (statement of Mr.
Alesi). Curiously, stories about Arthur Shawcross never involved anydiscussion ofthe victims'
stories; only the -story of the perpetrator. It was as if telling stories of adult female victims
would somehow undermine support for Megan's Law.
277. It appears that Sherry Lindsay was a child. She was described as a daughter of a police
officer, thus establishing her in her child context. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6620
(statement of Sen. Skelos). She also was described as delivering papers, which invoked images
of the traditional childhood paper route. Id. Descriptions of Lindsay, however, did not reveal
her age. E.g., id.; N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6645 (statement of Sen. Libous). A search
of the LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File did not reveal any additional information on this
person.
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addition, one legislator told his own account of childhood victimization.27 Arguing
for the efficacy of the bill, New York legislators also suggested that the bill might
have saved children's lives, and noted that it would empower parents to better protect
children.279 Several New York legislators did, however, suggest that the bill would
protect not only children, but women as well."
"Issue frames" are an essential part of political discourse.21' "Frames are more than
simply positions or arguments about an issue .... [hey spell out the essence of the
problem, suggest how it should be thought about, and may go so far as to recommend
what (if anything) should be done." 282 Political leaders use public venues, like
legislative debates, to provide the public with these convenient shortcuts for
evaluating social policy. 3 Why did legislators in both jurisdictions frame Megan's
Law almost exclusively in terms of child protection? Several explanations seem
possible. Legislators mayhave been attempting to square their rhetoric with the name
of the bill. If the bill was designed to protect the Megan Kankas of the world,
legislators reified this narrow description of the law by ignoring all other possible
beneficiaries. More likely, however, legislators selected a child-protection claim
because they saw it as the most salient and convincing basis for legislative action.
Child protection has been a recurring and effective issue frame throughout the past
century.2 ' The modem era of child protection dates to a 1962 study in the Journal of
the American Medical Association entitled The Battered Child Syndrome,28 which
spurred a wave of concern about physical abuse of children. 6 The 1970s featured
panic over child pornography.2 In the 1980s, child protection advocates focused on
a fear of widespread child abduction; the most memorable icon of this movement was
the ubiquitous picture of a missing child on the sides of milk cartons.288 In the late
1980s, the new terror was ritual abuse, fueled by the recently discovered "recovered
memory syndrome."28 9 Finally, by the 1990s, child advocates perched on the issue of
sexual predators. Although their claims were repeatedly refuted-child pornography
was shown to be far less common than suggested, for instance, and the remarkable
statistics showing mass abduction were later shown to be wildly overblown2°--child
protection advocates garnered both media attention and public support.29'
278. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
280. See, e.g., N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6580 (statement of Sen. DiCarlo) (stating
"we've got to protect the women and children of this state"); id. at 6660 (statement of Sen.
Jones) (noting that bill also protects women).
281. Donald R. Kinder & Thomas E. Nelson, Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in
American Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 1055, 1057 (1996).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1057-58.
284. Several commentators have documented the centrality of child protection as an issue
frame. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 58, at 3-8; JENKINS, supra note 21.
285. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
286. BEST, supra note 58, at 66-67.
287. See JENKINS, supra note 21, at 146-54.
288. BEST, supra note 58, at 22-24.
289. See JENKINS, supra note 21, at 164-88.
290. Id. at 146.
291. See William S. Lofquist, Constructing "Crime": Media Coverage of Individual and
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It is easy to see why legislators framed Megan's Law in terms of child protection.
The press and the public had already shown a particular interest in the issue. More
importantly, by asserting that the bill's purpose was protecting children, supporters
inoculated it from attack; no sane representative would go on the record against this
goal. Children are unassailable victims. Not only are they vulnerable, they are also
viewed unambiguously as innocents. Unlike women, whose claims of sexual
victimization have been subjected to attack,2 children are neverperceived as culpable
for any sexual abuse that might befall them. Legislators framed Megan's Law in terms
of child protection because it provided uncomplicated, unambiguous grounds for
legislative action.
D. Demographic Implications
One striking difference between the debates was their differing consideration of the
demographic consequences of Megan's Law. In the federal debates, little explicit
discussion was dedicated to the sexual, racial, or geographic impact of the bill. While
one congressman assured the House that most sexual offenders-other than the
drunken stepfather-were men molesting boys, 93 other legislators were silent as to
the likely sexual identity of sex offenders. Similarly, legislators entirely eschewed
discussion of race. Perhaps most problematically, they did not discuss whether
Megan's Law would have differing effects in cities versus lower-density areas.2"
Legislators made demographic claims implicitly, however, through the very terms
of their narratives. For instance, the great majority of child-victim stories involved
white children as victims.295 Megan Kanka was a white child victimized by a white
Organizational Wrongdoing, in CONSTRUCTING CRIME: PERSPECTIVE ON MAKING NEWS &
SOCIALPROBLEMS, supra note 228, at 241,243. One commentator has argued that medianews
is framed in such a way as to create a "discourse of fear." David L. Altheide, The News Media,
the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38 SOC. Q. 647, 648 (1997).
292. The concept of"date rape," for example, has been repeatedly challenged on the grounds
that the victims are partially culpable for their victimization. See, e.g., Twenty Questions:
Camille Paglia, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1991, at 132. Paglia, a bete noire of the women's movement,
argues women must bear some responsibility for sexual assault:
Have twelve tequilas at a fraternity party and a guy asks you to go up to his room,
and then you're surprised when he assaults you? Most women want to be seduced
or lured.... Pursuit and seduction are the essence of sexuality. It's part of the
sizzle. Girls hurl themselves at guitarists, right down to the lowest bar band here.
The guys are strutting. If you live in rock and roll, as I do, you see the reality of
sex, of male lust and women being aroused by male lust. It attracts women. It
doesn't repel them. Women have the right to freely choose and to say yes or no.
Everyone should be personally responsible for what happens in life. I see the
sexual impulse as egotistical and dominating, and therefore I have no problem
understanding rape. Women have to understand this correctly and they'll protect
themselves better.
Id. at 170; see also KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFrER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON
CAMPUS 17-21 (1993).
293. See supra text accompanying note 133.
294. See supra text accompanying note 200-01.
295. The only possible exceptions are one case involving the child of migrant workers, see
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offender2" who lived in a predominately white, middle-class low-density residential
community 97 Legislators never explicitly mentioned either Megan Kanka's or Jesse
Timmendequas's race. Other than referring to it as Hamilton Township, nobody ever
talked about Megan's neighborhood. Their failure to address these issues explicitly,
however, did not make them disappear. People familiar with the Megan Kanka saga
would have seen pictures of Megan and of Timmendequas and footage of suburban
Hamilton Township.29 By citing Megan Kanka, as well as Jacob Wetterling (from
small-town St. Joseph, Minnesota) and Polly Klaas (from suburban Petaluma,
California),2 as prototypical cases of child sexual assault, legislators implicitly
suggested that Megan's Law addressed a problem of suburban (or small town) white-
on-white crime."° Senator Gramnm was almost blunt, describing Ashley Estell as a
resident of an "upscale suburb.., one of the finest communities in America." ''
In the New York debate, demographic issues received somewhat more
consideration. One senator, for instance, expressly asked whether Megan's Law would
cover people of both sexes. 2 Of course, he cautioned, it was hard to imagine a
woman raping a man in the traditional sense of rape. 33 Legislators also addressed the
impact of the law on cities versus lower-density areas. Critics of the bill, including
legislators who ultimately voted for it, noted that it would have minimal benefits in
high-density communities and might even cause sex offenders to congregate in cities.
The repeated invocation of the Megan Kanka story (as well as Assemblyman Spano's
personal account) implied that the law was principally a regulation of white people.
Critics' claims about the bill's impact on cities, however, contained embedded
supra text accompanying note 99, and several children of unidentified race mentioned by Rep.
Jackson-Lee, see, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 10,313 (1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee)
(mentioning Monique Miller); id. at 8599 (mentioning Monique Miller, Elizabeth Pena, and
Jennifer Ertman). Rhetoreticians have noted that silence about race is an active, interpretable
event. Crenshaw, supra note 40, at 260.
296. Interestingly, despite the fact that race was an issue in the New Jersey Supreme Court's
review of Timmendequas's conviction, the court declined to state the race of either Kanka or
Timmendequas. It merely noted that they "were of the same race." New Jersey v.
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 79 (N.J. 1999). For whatever reasons, the LEXIS online editors
were more blunt. The LEXIS syllabus of the case explicitly states that both parties were white.
New Jersey v. Timmendequas, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 1007, at *7 (N.J. Aug. 11, 1999).
297. Hamilton Township covers 115 square miles yet has a total population of
approximately 17,000 people. Of this group, almost 13,000 residents are white and about 2360
are African-American. The overall density is approximately 147 persons per square mile. It is
solidly middle class; the median family income is slightly over $44,000 per year. County
Seat of Atl. County, Statistics and Demographics of Hamilton Township, at
http://www.algorithms.com/users/davies2/stats.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2001).
298. Hamilton Township is located outside of Atlantic City, New Jersey.
299. Petaluma is located about thirty miles from San Francisco, California.
300. Richard Allen Davis, who was convicted of Polly Klaas's murder, was white. Klaas
Jury Hears Taped Confession, at http:llwww.cnn.comlUS/9605/01ldaas (May 1, 1996).
301. Supra text accompanying note 104. Both Estell and the man convicted of her murder
were white. Robert Riggs, DNA Tests Stir Emotions in Child Murder Case, at
http:llwfaa.com/wfaa/articledisplay/0, 002,11473,00.html (June 21, 2000).
302. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6605-08 (statement of Sen. Marchi).
303. Id. at 6606.
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arguments about race: unlike the largely white population of New York's small towns,
New York City, with its large minority population, would receive few of the benefits
and suffer disproportionate costs of this new legislation.30,
There were concrete reasons why legislators might have preferred Megan's Law to
be viewed as regulating only whites. During the period that these laws were under
consideration, commentators were drawing attention to racism within the American
criminal system. 3°5 The prosecution of O.J. Simpson spurred these feelings; one poll,
taken before his acquittal, showed that eighty-seven percent of African-Americans
believed Simpson was a"victim ofa racist criminal justice system."3' Critics charged
that the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, of which the Wetterling
Act was a small part, would have a disparate impact on African-Americans.0 7 In this
political atmosphere, it must have been a relief-and even a pleasure-to promote a
bill that would not only avoid charges of racism, but might be seen as virtually
inapplicable to African-Americans. Yet legislators surely knew this suggestion was
false. For instance, 1995 crime statistics indicated that, as a percentage of their
population, African-Americans were charged with sex crimes over twice as frequently
as whites.0 8 Moreover, to the extent that the criminal justice system was racist, and
blacks were convicted at disproportionately high rates, the law's disproportionate
impact on African-Americans only increased.
The failure of federal legislators to address the question of geographical
304. Although complaints about the relevance of Megan's Law to city dwellers were never
couched in racial terms, one legislator comnented that the legislature's failure to consider high-
density areas was "a little offensive to me." N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 397 (statement
of Mr. Sullivan).
305. See, e.g., Cynthia Tucker, At the Fringes ofJustice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 13,
1995, at C7, LEXIS, News Library, ATLJNL File (citing the Mumia Abu-Jamal case as reason
blacks see the system as racist). Paul Butler, a law professor, made the controversial suggestion
that, in order to fight racism in the criminal system, African-American jurors should vote to
acquit all black defendants in certain types of cases. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). Because
of his provocative suggestion, Butler's essayreceived attention in the popular media. See, e.g.,
Ellen Hale, Juries, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Jan. 28, 1996, at A9, 1996 WL 2818955;
Frank Santiago, A Red-Hot Subject for Judges, Lawyers, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 17, 1995, at
1, 1995 WL 7224642.
306. Richard Price, Racial Split Widens, USA TODAY, July 25, 1995, at 3A; see also
Editorial, The Fuhrman Tapes, BALT. SUN, Sept. 1, 1995, at 18A, LEXIS, News Library,
BALSUN File (suggesting that the Furman tapes confirmed African-Americans' view that the
criminal system was racist).
307. Carl T. Rowan, Atrocious Crime Bill Must Die, CI. SUN-TIMES, July 29, 1994, at 29
(suggesting that death penalty provisions would have disparate racial impact).
308. In 1995, for instance, 42.4% of all individuals arrested for forcible rape and 22.6% of
all individuals arrested for sex charges other than forcible rape and prostitution were black.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1996, at 383 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore, eds. 1996). African-Americans
make up only thirteen percent of the nation's total population. JESSE MCKINNON & KAREN
HUMES, THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Populations Report Series P20-530, 1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2000pubs/p20-530.pdf.
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distinctions-the effects of the law on city dwellers compared to
suburbanites-presumablyreflectedasimilarpolitical expediency. Bythe early 1990s,
a majority of American voters were suburbanites.3" A chief factor driving people to
the suburbs was a search for security1 ° and these high-profile child murders left
suburbanites highly insecure. For legislators fighting to secure the suburban vote,"
Megan's Laws were a welcome opportunity to address this panic. If these provisions
did not have a similarbeneficial effect on city voters, legislators wereprobably willing
to seek other means to curry their support.
E. Explaining Differences
How can we explain the distinctions between the congressional and New York
debates? There were three respects in which the venues differed. First, unlike the
relativelyprivate New York discussions, the federal debates were nationally televised.
Second, the New York legislature was more ideologically diverse than Congress. And
third, the New York debate was structured to encourage more back and forth
discussion.
One big reason why the Congressional debate featured more vivid stories and
dramatic statistics, and less focus on the substantive benefits and costs of Megan's
Law, may have been the presence of C-SPAN. Federal legislators know they
command a national audience312 and they know this audience is particularly
influential. Thus, unlike New York legislators who may have perceived the debates
more as an interpersonal discussionbetweencolleagues, members of Congress seemed
to play to the cameras. Vivid stories and bold statistics are more dramatic and more
likely to draw in the casual channel surfer. They also make for better clips on the
television news. As a result, legislators may have focused on these media friendly
aspects of the debate, eschewing the dull, nuts-and-bolts issues, and avoiding
complicated questions relating to the efficacy and costs of Megan's Law.
Asecond distinctionbetweenthe two legislatures was ideological. Unlike Congress,
309. William Schneider, The Suburban Century Begins: The Real Meaning of the 1992
Election, ATLANTIc, July 1992, at 33.
310. Id.
311. The 1992 election featured a fight for suburban voters. Id. Because of the larger size
of their electoral districts, a larger portion of federal legislators probably relied on suburban
votes than did their New York counterparts.
312. Indeed, federal legislators clearly believed they were being watched. In the course of
the U.S. congressional debate over Megan's Law, legislators made several references to the
viewing audience. In one case, a congressman showed aphoto of Jacob Wetterling-aboywho
was missing fromMinnesota and after whom the first federal Megan's Lawbill wasnamed-in
case any viewers might have seen him. 139 CoNG. REc. 31,251 (1993) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) ("Next to me are two photographs.. . of Jacob, which I hope the camera will capture
.... I hope if anyone watching recognizes Jacob they will call 1-800-843-5678.").
On another occasion, Representative Dornan implored viewers to get copies of the day's
CongressionalRecord so they could see an article, included in theRecord, entitledPedophilia
Chic. 142 CONG. REC. 17,114 (1996) (statement of Rep. Doman). In some cases, legislators
did not attempt to take advantage of the likely viewership, but acknowledged it nonetheless.
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 24,846 (1996) (statement of Rep. Watt) (noting that his comments
would engender many phone calls).
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the New York legislature included representatives on both sides of the Megan's Law
issue." 3 This diversity had a concrete impact on the debates as a whole. New York
Megan's Law opponents achieved two different things. By challenging proponents'
claims for the law, they forced these supporters to sharpen and narrow their
arguments. Rather than rely on rhetorical flourish, New York supporters of the bill
provided more relevant statistics while at the same time conceding the significant
limitations of the law. Opponents also succeeded in expanding the scope ofthe debate,
articulating concerns about the law that never surfaced in Congress.
A final difference between the two debates was structural. Because the New York
debates each occurred on single days, centered on a single bill, supporters and
opponents were able to engage in an active, focused dialogue about Megan's Law.
Combined with the chambers' ideological diversity, this structure may have
encouraged a more wide ranging and thorough discussion of issues. In Congress, on
the other hand, the Megan's Law debate took the form of speeches, rather than
focused debate, allowing easy avoidance of complex issues and questions.
IV. ASSESSING THE RHETORIC OF MEGAN'S LAW
The federal and New York Megan's Law debates offered strong claims for new
regulations on child sex offenders. They contained partisan language, as well as
various rhetorical tropes-like the extensive use of storytelling-designed to establish
the incontrovertible need for Megan's Law. Yet for all their power, it remains unclear
whether they met the three purposes legislative debate typically seems to serve:
influencing voting decision, educating the media and the public, and establishing a
historical record for the purpose ofjudicial interpretation.314
It is very difficult to assess whether the rhetoric of the Megan's Law debates
resulted in vote shifting. Two things are known. First, three opponents of the 1996
Megan's Law changed their votes after the initial ballot, causing the bill to be
approved unanimously.31 Second, several New York legislators who expressed
reservations about Megan's Law ultimately voted for the bill. Legislators no doubt felt
much public pressure to support the legislation; whether or not rhetoric played a part
in legislators' decisions to follow the popular will is hard to gauge.
Clearly, Megan's Law supporters used rhetoric designed to make opposition to the
law politically impossible. They employed a three-part rhetorical strategy that
advocates have used previously to push public support for other child protection
legislation: typification, statistical manipulation, and melodrama. During the late
1980s, for instance, advocates argued for new stranger child-abduction laws by
making these same three claims. First, citing particularly horrible, well-publicized
abductions-cases like the Jacob Wetterling incident-they argued that these
incidents were typical of the broader abduction problem1 6 Second, they grossly
exaggerated the extent of the crisis, pointing to the high rate of total child abductions
313. The New York State Assembly, controlled by Democrats, was typically seen as liberal
while the state's senate was viewed as conservative. Symposium, supra note 20, at 39
(comments of Rob ert T. Farley).
314. See supra Part I.A.
315. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
316. BEsT, supra note 58, at 71.
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(a number which consisted largely of parental kidnappings) as evidence of a massive
stranger abduction crisis." 7 Finally, they described their political struggle as a
melodrama: a battle of good (child protectors) versus evil (child abusers)."' As a
result of this effective rhetoric, activists successfully convinced the public that
stranger child abduction was a scourge sweeping the nation.1 9
Legislative advocates for Megan's Law used these same techniques. They typified
child sex abuse by reference to particularly horrific rape and murder cases; they
framed the problem by reference to irrelevant or deceptive statistics; and, by using
dehumanizing language, theyturned the fight against child sex abuse into melodrama.
These claims were designed to capture public attention, and short-circuit any reasoned
debate about the proposed law. Given the effectiveness of these techniques in prior
public-policy campaigns, opponents of Megan's Law could reasonably have
concluded that the public would view their opposition to Megan's Law as not only
irresponsible, but active promotion of the force of evil.
The Megan's Law debates offered some educational benefits to the public. Because
congressional debate was available via C-SPAN, it is likely that media and political
elites, as well as the public, were privy to the legislative dialogue. What sorts of
education did these debates confer, however? For those citizens who had not heard
of these high-profile cases previously, the debate served as notice that parents must
consciouslyprotect their children. It is less clear, however, whether the federal debate
provided listeners a fair understanding of the scope or nature of the nation's child
sexual abuse problem. Through the various rhetoric techniques discussed above,
legislators inaccurately characterized child sex abuse as manifesting itself principally
in the form of abduction followed by rape (and sometimes murder).2 In fact, the vast
majority of child sex abuse occurs at the hands of relatives or acquaintances; almost
fifty percent of all offenders are parents or parental figures.32' Legislators also failed
to link the proposed law to the abuse problems they identified; they never explained
whether Megan's Law would do anything to protect the large numbers of children
"abused and neglected," "abducted," or "victimized."
Megan's Law supporters in Congress also did little to educate the public about the
policy concerns surrounding Megan's Law. They failed to tell the public that the bill,
although cast as a regulation of offenders who sexually molest children, was really a
regulation of a wide array of sexual offenders as well as certain offenders who had
never engaged in any sexual misconduct. They did not address the potentially
significant economic costs of the bill." They failed to explore, and even
misrepresented, the demographic impact of the legislation. Finally, they never
discussed the forces that might have contributed to sexual abuse and spent little time
confronting the social costs of the bill.
Although fewer people heard the New York debate, it provided a substantively
317. Id. at 46-50, 59.
318. See JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK AouT NEw CRIMES AND NEW
VICTIMS 89-90 (1999); BEST, supra note 58, at 5-6.
319. BEST, supra note 58, at 151-75.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 258-63.
321. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 50
(1998).
322. Koenig, supra note 187, at 763.
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better education to those listeners. Legislators did frame the child sexual abuse
problem in somewhat misleading ways, of course, and they also incorrectly implied
that the bill was limited to child sex offenders. Butbecause of active opposition to the
provision, supporters conceded that the law would not significantly reduce the child
sexual abuse problem. Opponents also alerted listeners to the bill's social costs and
disparate demographic impact. Moreover, legislators spent some time discussing the
bill's practical details. A person listening to the debate would have learned, for
instance, that the bill created a 900 phone number for concerned neighbors;3" that the
public would have to go to the police station to view offenders' pictures;" and that
offenders would be entitled to counsel at the time of their risk assessment hearing.3"
Finally, the Megan's Law debates provided potentially valuable material for the
purpose ofjudicial interpretation. While members of Congress made almost no effort
to flesh out the details of the bill, New York legislators did explain how certain
portions of Megan's Law were to be applied. More importantly, legislators in both
venues offered suggestions about the purpose of the bill. Many were explicit that the
bill was designed to protect the community. Yet beyond these comments, reviewing
courts could find other material that would aid their interpretation of the laws.
Imbedded in the various slpeeches were expressions of anger against offenders. These
comments led one court to conclude that the true intent of the New York Megan's
Law was not public safety, but rather punishment and retribution. 26 This example
suggests that, whether or not legislators intend to shape judicial interpretation of a bill,
their comments may prove valuable to a reviewing court.
What then can we conclude about the rhetoric of this one-sided debate? What
differences surface when comparing Congress's entirely one-sided discussion with
New York's slightly more adversarial model? First, it appears that even one-sided
debate can produce passionate and substantive discussion of new law. Legislators in
both venues spoke out forcefully for Megan's Law; federal legislators did not offer
a weaker appeal simply because they faced no challenge. Second, it is clear that
Congress's nonadversarial debate was driven less by a need for a comprehensive
discussion and explication of the law, and more by theater. When legislators felt
unchallenged in debate, they were free to argue in vivid and dramatic, if at times
misleading, terms. In New York, on the other hand, even a small number of opponents
were able to significantly broaden debate, and force proponents to admit some of the
bill's weaknesses. Third, it seems that even in a one-sided debate, the public will
receive some information about new legislation. The information will not necessarily
be tempered by honest discussion of the bill's limitations, however. Finally, it is
evident that even nonadversarial debate can provide valuable rhetorical material that
courts can use to interpret the law.
It is difficult to know whether legislatures can improve the quality of debate about
bills, like Megan's Law, that enjoy widespread legislative and popular support. Any
effort to eliminate particular rhetorical tropes would be not only practically
impossible, but ill-advised. Barring the use of stories would not improve lawmaking
323. N.Y. Assembly, supra note 43, at 331-37 (back-and-forth discussion).
324. Id. at 327-29 (back-and-forth discussion).
325. N.Y. Senate, supra note 105, at 6632-33 (back-and-forth discussion).
326. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 605, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd inpart and rev'd
in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
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because vivid storytelling can promote both good and bad social policy. Similarly, it
would be foolish to eliminate the use of statistics in legislative debate simply because
they are subject to manipulation. Legislatures shouldattempt to identify the nature and
extent of a problem before they act and statistics can be a valuable tool in this
analysis. Nonetheless, legislatures ought to consider at least two possible approaches
to improving and enriching the rhetoric of debate.
One direction for improvement might be creation of a "public advocate," a
legislative equivalent to the judiciary's public defender. This person would be
empowered to participate in legislative debate when a bill has little or no opposition.
This public advocate might be allowed to participate upon the (possibly anonymous)
request of only one legislator. She might argue reasons to oppose a law, challenge
claims made by a provision's supporters, or suggest better alternatives to the bill. She
could introduce countemarratives that might challenge assumptions of the majority.
Her sole job would be to insure that no law was adopted without the valuable benefits
conferred by a full, honest, and comprehensive debate.
As a second approach to improving legislative debate, legislatures might consider
creating their own "code of debate." These aspirational rules would be designed to
encourage legislators to offer honest claims and address the full panoply of policy
concerns. For instance, legislators might be bound to tell stories ethically. One
commentator has suggested, for instance, that fair storytelling requires storytellers to
"1) rely upon a broad factual basis; 2) demonstrate clear regard for interpersonal
complexities; 3) emphasize the psychological apparatus and intentional states of mind
of the participants; and 4) acknowledge the narrator's bias."'327 Legislators might also
be asked to explain the precise nature of their statistical claims and provide citations
to applicable studies. A bill's supporters might be bound to discuss various
shortcomings of the bill and explain why it is nonetheless a sound policy choice.
Neither of these proposals is by any means a panacea. Nonetheless, they suggest
that improving legislative debate is not impossible. At minimum, legislators should
begin to examine their own rhetoric, as well as the reasons they engage in debate, to
assure that they, and their legislative institutions, are doing their best to make the
process fair, honest, and productive.
CONCLUSION
The study of legislative rhetoric, even the one-sided Megan's Law debate, has
unearthed interesting, and telling, material. This Article establishes not only that such
rhetoric is consequential, but that there is a need for other scholars to begin to take
legislative rhetoric seriously. Legislators, courts, and the public at large will all benefit
from future research in this area. Rhetoric is a potent tool, all the more so when
employed in the public legislative chamber. In the end, legislatures, and individual
legislators, must take responsibility for using this rhetoric in positive ways, and
scholars can work to assist elected officials in this important quest.
327. Troutt, supra note 37, at 96.
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